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fABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is threefold:
• To evaluate how the portfolio performance of institutional investors differs 
from the market index portfolio, first, as a whole, and second, as several 
different institutional ownership portfolios.
• To investigate the relationship between the institutions' superior stock 
selection ability and firm quality attributes such as beta, volatility, firm size, 
and R&D expenditures. Most previous academic work has focused on 
institutional investment behaviors, finding the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm quality attributes, based on only mutual 
funds.
• To develop a decision model for future institutional investors' portfolio 
performance based on the explanatory variables used in this study. The 
dependent variable is portfolio gross return, and firm quality attributes are 
independent.
The study group is selected from firms listed on the Compact Disclosure 
database during the period Jan. 1989 - Dec. 1996. Approximately 8,000 NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ companies are employed in this study. As analytical tools,
iii
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fSharpe’s measure (1966), Jensen's alpha measure (1968), and Jobson and Koririe’s Z- 
statistic (1981) are used.
From the results of the study, one may conclude that institutional investors as 
a whole are not superior stock selectors; however, specific institutional ownership 
portfolios performed in a superior manner. The institutions’ superior selection ability 
is partly related to such firm quality attributes as small firm and stock volatility effects. 
Previous studies find that institutional ownership is related to firm size; however, 
institution’s portfolio performances are found to be inversely related to size. Higher 
beta is not found to contribute to institutions' superior portfolio performance. This 
study found that institutional investors act in a hyperopic manner when tested with 
R&D expenditures. However, amounts of a firm’s R&D expenditures are inversely 
related to institutions’ superior performance. Unexpectedly, stock volatility is found 
to contribute to institutions’ portfolio excess returns, based on Jensen’s measure.
Finally, all firm quality attributes employed in this study as explanatory 
variables appear to be significantly related to portfolio returns. All variables are 
positively related to portfolio gross returns except R&D, which is inversely related.
iv
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rCHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Institutional investors1 provide the largest and most popular types of publicly 
available portfolio management services. They charge fees for their services, and they 
manage trillions of dollars of marketable securities.
As large shareholders, institutional investors gain economies of scale in 
information gathering and analysis of investments, and they possess better knowledge 
about the market than individual investors (Black, 1992). They employ stock analysts 
who draw on sophisticated computer-aided information networks when evaluating the 
appropriateness of company expenditures. Individuals typically do not have access to 
these resources. Institutional investors can process information more thoroughly before 
making investment decisions, and as a result, they can make more rational investment 
decisions than can individuals (Kochhar and David, 1996).
Corporate stock holdings by institutional investors have increased substantially 
since Berle and Means (1932) conducted the first published study on stock ownership. 
Institutions held $2.68 trillion in stocks at the end of 1992, a 48% jump from the $1.8
'Pension funds, insurance companies, banks, investment counselors, mutual funds, and financial 
institutions.
1
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2
trillion held in 1990. Institutions held 46.8% of the outstanding publicly traded equity 
in the United States as of beginning of 1993 (WSJ, Dec. 8, 1993).2 Those investors 
engaged in approximately 75% of the dollar volume of trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange (Brown and Brooke, 1993). Recent New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
surveys showed that institutional investors accounted for about 70% of its daily trading 
volume (Szewczyk et al., 1992).
Growth created a great amount of interest in institutional investors, and their 
performance stimulated considerable research related to performance and investment 
choices, as well as continual monitoring and evaluation by investors. The monitoring 
created incentives to make sound investment decisions that outside parties would deem 
reasonable, well-informed, and prudent (Badrinath et al., 1989), thus implying that 
institutional investors should provide fiduciary duties in handling client capital.
Institutional investors began to apply a "safety-net" rule (named by Badrinath 
et al. in 1989) as a guide in determining investment choices. Managers who breached 
their fiduciary duty were subjected to severe penalties under both common law and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Such restrictions on 
institutional investors affected the behavior of institutional investment. For example,
2As of September 30,1996, institutional investors held 44.25% ofthe outstanding publicly traded 
equity listed on the NYSE and AMEX. Institutions held $3,880 trilion of overall market value of stocks 
based on these two stock markets (Compact Disclosure, 30 September 1996). This study utilized data 
from 1906 of the 1979 firms listed on the NYSE. Similarly, it used data for 483 of the 566 firms listed 
on AMEX. It excluded the statistics for the other 73 NYSE-listed firms and the other 83 AMEX-listed 
firms because of missing market value or institutional holdings information. Institutional investors held 
more NYSE stocks than AMEX stocks. (44.46% of NYSE stocks and 28.7% of AMEX stocks).
J
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institutional investors concentrated their activity on the stocks of large firms because 
of the more volatile behavior of small firms (Badrinath et al., 1989).
Much research during the last 30 years questioned whether any investment 
strategy could consistently produce results superior to those obtained from simply 
holding the market portfolio. Did they determine that institutional investors possessed 
a real power to earn an above-normal rate of return in the securities market? Did those 
institutional investors earn more than individual investors with less inference 
capabilities than institutions? Or did they earn more than the passive strategy of 
holding a market index portfolio? Research has produced neither a universally accepted 
answer nor a theory to underlie the answer.
Recently, researchers have questioned whether other institutional investors could 
produce results equal to those of mutual funds. One such research team, Bogle and 
Twardowski (1980), concluded that among institutional investors, mutual funds 
provided the highest equity rates of return. The collective literature, however, has not 
stated whether collective institutional investors functioned as superior portfolio 
performers compared to benchmark index funds.
Statement of the Problem
Despite the rapid growth of institutions’ corporate stock holdings, performance 
evaluations of institutional investors do not completely account for investment behavior. 
Previous research has revealed relationships between firm attributes and ownership of 
common stocks; however, no published work that studied the relationship between each
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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attribute and institutional portfolio performance was found. Additionally, past research 
has not identified what effects, if any, institutions had on capital markets or on 
corporate strategies.
The negative relationship of a firm's volatility and institutional ownership might 
be positively related to institutional portfolio returns (i.e., a security with high risk 
should have provided a high return to risk averse investors.) Safety-net theory has 
suggested that institutional investors prefer large firms to small firms. However, there 
is evidence that small firms generated greater risk-adjusted rates of return.
An investigation of whether the performance of institutional investors, taken as 
a whole, exceeded the performance of the overall market should have concerned 
professional investors and financial-markets researchers. For example, as the safety-net 
theory implied, an inferior performance by institutional investors might have resulted 
from selecting securities emphasizing safety rather than return. This result might come 
from considerable prudence by institutional investors in their portfolio management.
Most previous studies in this area have concentrated on mutual funds’ 
performance. However, mutual funds could not represent the panoply of institutional 
investors because each investor might have different interests as well as different 
transaction costs. If institutional investors performed as superior investors, where did 
the extra returns come from? Did they originate in beta (P), stock volatility (o), or 
firm size effects? Finally, did this superior selection ability of institutional investors, 
taken as a group, contribute to the rapid growth of institutional holdings of corporate 
stocks?
J
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Capital-market researchers need to investigate whether institutional investors 
have superior portfolio selection ability. Employers must meet prudent investing 
standards under the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and evaluate 
how the need to fond retirement benefits can affect their long-term earnings. If they 
or their portfolio managers select superior portfolios, the firms’ returns ability will 
improve. Employers typically rely on institutional investors such as insurance 
companies, investment advisors, or specialized mutual funds acting on behalf of pension 
funds to perform portfolio selection.
Scope and Purpose of the Study
This study analyzes the cross-sectional predictability of equity returns in 
institutional investment portfolios. It emphasizes individual security characteristics 
rather than portfolio properties, and it focuses on determining factors that influence 
portfolio excess returns. The study uses five variables: percentage of institutional stock 
holdings, systematic risk (represented by p), return volatility (represented by standard 
deviation), firm size, and R&D expenditures. It investigates the causes of extra returns 
from institutional portfolios without discriminating between types of institutions.
This study encompasses the following:
1. Compares the monthly return behavior of portfolios dominated by 
institutional investors with portfolios dominated by individual or other 
investors, such as an index fund.
2. Examines portfolios to determine whether stock portfolios held in greater 
percentage by institutional investors exhibit higher risk-adjusted rates of 
return than those with less holdings by institutional investors.
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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3. Tests whether institutional investors exploited the small firm effect in the
investment. (High returns from investments in small firms relative to
returns from investments in larger firms suggest that institutional investors 
cautiously employed small firms, also, in their investment selection.)
4. Tests for market risk-retum relationship as implied by the CAPM. (In
other words, this study tests for a positive or negative relationship between 
levels of risk and portfolio returns in the context of institutional ownership 
of corporate stocks.)
3. Tests the relationship between individual stock volatility and institutional 
portfolio returns. (This test makes it possible to see how the a-retum 
relationship differs from the P-retum relationship.)
6. Examines whether a firm’s R&D spending relates positively or negatively 
to the rate of return in the institutional portfolio.
7. Jointly estimates the effects of the five factors (firm size, systematic risk, 
volatility, R&D, and levels of institutional ownership) on portfolio returns 
of institutional investors.
Chapter 2 reviews related theory, Chapter 3 reviews empirical studies, and 
Chapter 4 reports the hypotheses. Chapter S describes the sample, data characteristics, 
and the methodology used in the study. Chapter 6 presents the results of testing 
procedures. Chapter 7 summarizes the study, presents conclusions, and 
makes recommendations for further research.
Attributes of Institutional Investment Behavior 
A recent study by Badrinath et al. (1989) found that institutional ownership is 
positively related to firm size, firm beta (P), trading liquidity of a security,3 the number
trading liquidity was measired by the most recent year's annual trading volume in the firm’s 
stock divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
J
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7of years of exchange listing for the firm, and is negatively related to firm specific risk, 
which is represented by stock volatility. Firm size, systematic risk and volatility were 
found by Badrinath et al. to have a statistically significant relationship with institutional 
ownership. The selection of variables for this study is based on the results of the 
Badrinath et al. study. In addition, the research and development (R&D) expenditures 
measure, which implies a firm's growth opportunity,4 is included in this study to see 
how it is related to portfolio returns in terms of various institutional ownership.
In the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), P represents systematic risk which 
cannot be eliminated by diversification. According to CAPM,5 the market compensates 
systematic risk, but not total risk. Previous research has indicated that high-P funds 
generally “outperformed" low-P funds relative to market-based portfolios of equal 
systematic risk (McDonald, 1974).
Stock volatility, which represents the total risk of a security (or portfolio), can 
be viewed as consisting of non-diversifiable risk (P) and diversifiable risk. Non- 
systematic risk represents the portion of an asset's risk associated with random causes 
that can be eliminated through diversification. It is attributable to firm specific events,
*Long and Malitz (1983) and Titman and Wessels (1988) used R&D expenditures and advertising 
as a proxy for the firm's growth opportunities.
SCAPM shows that the equilibrium rates of return on all risky assets are a function of their 
covariance with the market portfolio such that R., = ^  + (R„t ~ + ■ Where RJt «  the return
on security or capital asset j  at time t, R  ** the return on the market index, R* =  the riskfree rate of 
return, p{ =  covariance (Rjt iR ^ f V c i r { R and eJt =  abnormal return for security j at time t. 
More details about the CAPM will appear in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
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such as strikes, lawsuits, regulatory actions, loss of a key account, and so forth. In this 
study volatility (standard deviation) carries a broader conceptual meaning than 
systematic risk.
The small-firm effect puzzled researchers for several years after discovery by 
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981). They observed that common shares of small firms 
earned, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than those of large firms. Later studies 
showed that the small-firm effect occurred mostly in the first few trading days of 
January.
Hansen and Hill (1991) established a positive relationship between levels of 
institutional ownership and R&D expenditures. Two factors possibly explained this 
relationship: (1) Institutional investors had the competence to make a rational decision 
concerning share values (Heiner, 1983), and (2) many institutions effectively locked 
themselves into their stock holdings (Aoki, 1984). Since then, researchers have sought 
to determine whether greater R&D expenditures—with positive relationships to higher 
holdings by institutional owners—had any relationship with the rate of return.
Institutional clients’ objectives vary. Some clients place their savings with 
institutional investors to earn higher returns than they could obtain on their own. They 
reduce risk by holding an interest in a large and varied pool of securities, and the 
process allows a greater degree of liquidity (Pozen, 1994). Therefore, institutions 
might have more advantages of economies of scale and professionalism than 
individuals. If so, a higher R&D expenditure level relates positively to a greater rate 
of return in the collective portfolio of institutional investors.
Reproduced with permission o fthe  copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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According to the active investors' hypothesis (Jensen, 1991), institutions closely 
monitor firm managers and the strategic management of the firm, and they have better 
knowledge about the firms they select for their portfolios. Institutions typically do not 
invest for the short term (Kochhar and David, 1996); rather, they look for long-term 
benefits. The long-term orientation implies that institutional investors do not act in a 
myopic manner, and that as superior investors, they seek to actively influence corporate 
business decisions.
Perform ance o f Institutional Investment 
and Efficient Market Hypothesis
Most performance evaluations of institutional investment over the last 30 years 
focused only on mutual funds, because of the availability of accurate data (Bogle and 
Twardowski, 1980). These studies focused on the evaluation of institutional investment 
performance, particularly whether any investment strategy could consistently produce 
results superior to the most “naive” strategy of simply holding the market portfolio. 
The classic studies of the late 1960s generally concluded that mutual funds—after 
deducting operating expenses, management fees, and brokerage commissions— 
underperformed common market indices.6 These studies argued that with operating 
expenses and brokerage commissions added back to the fund returns, mutual funds 
produced a neutral performance. In other words, actively managed investment 
portfolios did not yield higher returns than those earned by randomly generated
6See Jensen (1968), Sharpe (1966), Treynor (1965), and Friend et al. (1962).
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portfolios. Previous researchers suggested that their evidence supported the “strong” 
form of the efficient market hypothesis, which holds that current prices of securities 
completely reflect the effects of all relevant information. Efforts to acquire and analyze 
this information cannot produce consistently superior results. Therefore, they 
characterized mutual funds' efforts to “beat the market” as futile.
There are few differences in the results on the mutual funds' performance 
reported by the studies of the 1960s and 1970s. Some differences in the results 
appeared. McDonald (1974), Mains (1977), and Kon and Jen (1979) (MMKJ) 
concluded that because of transaction costs and management fees, mutual funds as a 
whole showed neither significantly “superior” nor “inferior” performance. Put another 
way, the mutual funds were neutral performers. However, some managers had shown 
superior ability in stock selectivity and market timing.7
Given the selected levels of systematic risk, managers in the mutual fund sample 
in MMKJ did not consistently predict security prices well enough to outperform the 
naive policy (combinations of the riskless asset and market portfolio) by a margin 
sufficient to recoup all management fees and brokerage commissions. This finding is 
consistent with the “strong” form of the efficient market hypothesis and the evidence 
in Jensen (1968) or Kon and Jen (1979). MMKJ's results could not reject the idea that 
mutual funds should abandon security selection and market timing activities in favor of
7Stock selectivity, which is known as “security analysis,” means mutual funds’ superior ability 
to forecast price movements of selected individual stocks (i.e., micro forecasting). Market tining means 
fund managers’ ability to foscast price movements of the general stock market as a whole (i.e., macro 
forecasting).
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buy-and-hold policies. However, Mains (1977) began acknowledging the overall 
superior selectivity performance of the mutual fund managers through some 
modification in Jensen’s methodology in the late 1970s.
More studies of the superior abilities of mutual funds' managers in selectivity 
performance and market timing activity occurred in 1980s.8 Although more rigorous 
studies with many different methodologies9 have attempted to rebut the evidence of the 
first generation of studies, their common conclusions in the 1980s differed little from 
those of the 1970s. Even though the later researchers discussed partial evidence 
concerning mutual funds’ superior abilities, they found neither skillful market timing 
nor clever security selection abilities in abundance in observed mutual fund return data. 
Thus, they agreed with the general conclusion of the prior literature that mutual funds 
could not, collectively, outperform a passive investment strategy.
In the 1980s, several studies on mutual funds' performance produced a modified 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) whereby only some investors (i.e., informed traders) 
can afford the cost of collecting and acting on information. Hence these informed 
traders will earn higher returns than passive investors, but their profits from stock 
selection should only offset the costs of collecting information (Ippolito, 1993). This 
revised EMH, as introduced by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), gives a different idea of
8See, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Shawky (1982), Veit and Cheney (1982), Kon 
(1983), Henriksson (1984), Chang (1984) Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986), Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989), and Ippolito (1989).
9Chang and Lewellen (1984) and Henriksson (1984) used parametric methods. Kon (1983) used 
multivariate methods.
I
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EMH, emphasizing that security prices include all available information after a set of 
active investors expends resources to ensure this result. After allowances for expenses 
(and in equilibrium), the two investment strategies produce equal results. The market, 
as a whole, benefits from the activity of active investors because when they act on new 
information, others observe their actions, copy the actions, and thereby drive the 
market toward values that incorporate all available information, even though not all 
investors actually possess all information.
Those past studies have furnished partial evidence that some fund managers have 
superior ability. However, the overall findings generally agree with the hypothesis that 
actively managed mutual funds (net of expenses) do not perform significantly better 
than index funds. This conclusion does not suggest that all fund managers efficiently 
expend resources in search of new information all the time, nor does it suggest that 
fund managers as a whole spend money wisely in every period.
Evidently, most of the previously mentioned studies utilize performance data of 
mutual funds without using collective institutional investment performance data. 
Therefore, those researchers did not determine whether industry-wide data would 
produce results similar to those found in the individual studies using data for mutual 
funds.
Flrm-Size Effect and Institutional 
Holdings Relationship
Previous research has identified that institutional investors receive partial excess 
returns, but has not identified the causes of those partial excess returns. One causal
. 1
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factor may be the firm-size effect. Small-firm-effect research has thus far sampled data 
for individual stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX and OTC markets. The results 
indicate an inverse relationship between the market value of firms and their excess 
returns.
This study samples securities partly or exclusively owned by institutional 
investors in an attempt to determine whether institutional investors prefer small firms 
to large firms in their portfolio construction. If  so, institutional investors with greater 
equity position in small firms would more likely maximize portfolio returns than those 
with a strong equity position in the large firms.
Because institutional holdings and risk-adjusted average rates of return also vary 
with firm size of the stock in the portfolio, some investigators looked at the relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm size. Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p i 167) found 
an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and firm size measured by the 
market value of equity. Large firms exhibited a distinct separation between ownership 
and control. The large market value of the firms and the wide dispersion of 
shareholdings meant that institutional owners could not hold a sizable percentage of a 
given firm’s shares. The more-concentrated ownership structures of smaller firms, 
however, may have facilitated relatively substantial institutional holdings of their stock. 
Therefore, Demsetz and Lehn theorized a possible inverse relationship between firm 
size and institutional ownership.
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A recent study by Hansen and Hill (1991) on the relationship between the levels 
of institutional ownership and R&D spending reversed the previous views that 
institutions invest for the short term (Chote and Linger, 1986; Drucker, 1986 in Hansen 
and Hill). Most of the research that used financial data for the late 1970s and early 
1980s had characterized institutional portfolio managers as myopic investors who prefer 
to look at short-term stock prices. Consequently, that research had concluded that 
firms owned significantly by institutional investors tended to reduce their R&D 
spending. In the long term, reduced R&D spending would cause declining innovation, 
low productivity, and reduced competitiveness (Thurow, 1985).
Kochhar and David (1996) rebutted this traditional view. They concluded that 
institutional investors look for long-term benefits from their investments in the equity 
of a firm. This study seeks to determine whether a positive relationship between 
institutional holdings and R&D spending affects a portfolio's stock return.
Data Formation
This study utilizes monthly return data from January 1989 to December 1996 
for stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and OTC which meet the following additional 
criteria:
1. They must have data such as assets, stock price, and R&D expenditures 
available on Compact Disclosure.
2. The stocks must be held by at least one institutional investor.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
f15
This study employs a two-way grouping procedure to form portfolios for testing 
purposes. The entire sample of firms is classified into five portfolios based on the 
degrees of each of those variables.
For example, to test for firm size effects, the total assets of all firms are 
calculated as of October of each year from 1989 to 1996. Firms are ranked on the basis 
of their assets and placed into one of five portfolios. Hence, a small firm portfolio, a 
large firm portfolio, and three intermediate firm portfolios are created. Second, the 
monthly returns of firms within each portfolio are combined with equal-weights (//ft) 
to calculate the monthly return of the portfolio. Those five portfolios are compared, 
first, to each other (i.e., between a small firm group and a large firm group), and 
second, to market returns to see if there are any abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Each 
year new rankings are calculated, and the process is repeated. Two statistics, which 
are Jobson and Korkie's (1981) transformed Sharpe measure as well as Sharpe measure 
and Jensen's alpha measure, are applied to detect any firm size effect using these five 
portfolio returns. Remaining variables follow the same procedure as the firm size test.
However, for institutional holdings and R&D expenditures variables, this study 
employs another two-way grouping procedure to form portfolios. The entire sample 
is classified based on the three levels of institutional holdings and three levels of R&D 
expenditures. Group 1 contains stocks with the smallest percentage of ownership by 
institutions, while groups 2 and 3 contain an equal number of firms with equally 
increasing percentages of ownership by institutions' holdings.
.1
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Next, each subset portfolio is rearranged from high to low R&D expenditures 
to form approximately three equal-sized data sets. The final step is to divide the data 
set sample firms into three groups corresponding to the three levels of R&D 
expenditures. Any stocks with negative book value or negative market value are 
removed.
This procedure, which is similar to the procedure of Chan et al. (1991), results 
in nine portfolio groups. This portfolio formation procedure is performed in October 
of each of the years 1989 to 19% to reflect changes in the variable levels.
Two statistical tests are applied. One is Jobson and Korkie's (1981) transformed 
Sharpe measure. The Jobson and Korkie’s method was useful in single comparison. 
The other is Jensen's alpha measure based on the CAPM. Treynor measure, however, 
will not be used in this test because this measure was inappropriate for investors who 
have all of their assets in a portfolio (Jones, 1996).
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1CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED THEORIES 
Introduction
This study analyzes the performance of institutional investor portfolios relative 
to other firm quality characteristics such as systematic risk (P), volatility, firm size, and 
R&D expenditures. It examines the correspondence between institutional portfolio 
performance and changes in percentage of institutional holdings of stocks. The basis 
for this study derives from theories of an efficient market, mutual fund performance, 
P analysis, volatility (a), firm size, and R&D spending, as well as previous empirical 
research providing evidence supporting these theories.
This chapter briefly reviews EMH, institutional performance evaluation, P 
constant, firm size, and R&D expenditures in terms of institutional investor stock 
holdings.
Institutional Investor Holdings of Corporate
Stocks and Institutional Portfolio 
Performance
Institutional investors represent one of the fastest growing financial 
intermediaries in the American economy. Pension funds, life and property-liability 
insurance companies, investment companies, commercial banks, and other financial
17
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institutions exemplify these investors. Berle and Means called attention to the emerging 
power of institutional investors in 1932, and institutional holdings of corporate stocks 
have continually increased since then. The Federal Reserve (Szewczyk et al., 1992) 
reported that institutional holdings of common stock increased from approximately 15% 
of total outstanding equity in 1968 to over 30% in 1986. Recent research has examined 
the role of institutional investors in an attempt to determine how large investment 
institutions affected stock prices, firms’ investment behavior, portfolio returns, 
executive compensation, and other aspects of market behavior.
EMH (Efficient Market Hypothesis)
In an efficient market, investors have a wide array of relevant information 
available in a timely and low-cost manner. Security prices, therefore, reflect this 
information quickly and fully. Fama (1976) postulated three levels of market 
efficiency: weak, semi-strong, and strong. Each gradation corresponds to the amount 
of "available information” that the price reflects. According to the strong form of 
EMH, prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available relevant information; 
therefore, current prices provide accurate signals for capital allocations. This theory, 
however, does not imply perfectly competitive capital markets or costless information. 
Nor does it rule out some clever managers and some poorly performing ones (whether 
by lack of skill or lack of luck); it merely implies vigorous competition in capital 
markets.
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What if someone earns unusual returns after consideration of all transaction 
costs, even over a long period of time? Does this imply market inefficiency? Then 
why do anomalies occur even in an efficient market? Even fairly priced stocks 
pose firm-specific risk that managers can eliminate through diversification. Therefore, 
a professional portfolio manager with a well-diversified portfolio can still earn 
consistently greater-than-normal returns through either skillful ability or luck, even in 
an efficient market.10 However, not all mutual fund managers can earn abnormal 
returns. This means only a small number of professional investment superstars can 
consistently achieve superior performance.11
Do markets perform efficiently? Yes.12 Most research on professional 
managers’ risk-adjusted performances concludes that markets act efficiently, but 
markets reward especially diligent, intelligent, or creative managers (Bodie et al., 
1996).
10For example, see Kon and Jen (1979).
"Peter Lynch, Warren Buffet, John Templeton, and John Neff are among those mutual fund 
managers who have achieved a consistency o f superior performance over an extended period (Smith et 
al., 1992; Bodie etal., 1996).
l2The strongly efficient markets hypothesis requires that security prices reflect all information; 
in this formulation, even private information is available to the marketplace. Therefore, no one who 
trades on short-term security price movements can earn a profit larger than what could be earned with 
a naive buy-and-hold strategy. According to the strongly efficient market hypothesis, even those who 
possess inside information would not be able to earn an abnormal profit from it.
However, some empirical studies show that corporate insiders and a small number of 
professional investors can achieve consistently superior perfonmnce. In the efficient market theory, this 
kind of observed phenomenon which, according to theory ought not to happen but indeed does happen, 
constitutes an "anomaly."
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Ippolito (1993) introduced two approaches to a modem efficient market theory 
(EMT). The traditional view on EMH (across all three forms) holds that security prices 
already include all available information. The three forms of the EMH differ on the 
information considered available to the market. This traditional view implies equal 
returns across active and passive portfolios before subtracting trading and investment 
expenses, thus rendering active trading counter-productive. The other, a relatively new 
theory stressed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), argues that investors have an incentive 
to spend time and resources to analyze and uncover new information only if such 
activity will likely generate higher investment returns to the investors engaging in such 
private information creation and search. Thus, in market equilibrium, efficient 
information-gathering activity should produce favorable results.
Those two approaches explain how information gets embedded in prices. The 
EMT means that security prices include all available information after a set of active 
investors expend resources to obtain and act on it. The EMT means that, in 
equilibrium, investments in active and passive portfolios produce equal results (net of 
expenses).
Institutional Perform ance Evaluation
Because of the ready availability of data, financial analysts tend to use mutual 
fund performance as a proxy for all institutional investment performance. As a result, 
mutual fund performance has served as the basis for most of the historical review of 
institutional performance discussed in this section.
i
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Ippolito (1993) raised doubt that mutual funds' performance results represent 
the totality of institutional investors’ performance. Empirical studies do not yet address 
Ippolito's conjecture. Friend, Brown, Herman, and Vickers (1962)~and later Fama
(1965)-conducted the first extensive and systematic study of mutual fund performance. 
However, these early researchers did not consider risk in the measurement of 
performance, so their studies did not provide appropriate empirical studies of mutual 
fund performance.
Treynor (1963), Sharpe (1966), and Jensen (1968, 1969) conducted the most- 
cited studies on mutual fund performance. These models are called "one-parameter 
performance measures,13” because these measures utilize one number that reflects both 
risk and return simultaneously in the evaluation. The one-parameter studies made it 
possible to rank performance data and compare them to a naive market standard. These 
one-parameter measures use the CAPM as the basis of the models used in studying 
mutual fund performance. However, these measures differ from the two parameters 
in the CAPM, developed by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin
(1966), and Fama (1968). CAPM takes an ex ante single-period model to forecast 
expected rates of return for financial assets. However, the one-parameter measures 
now serve as models for evaluations or rankings of portfolio performance.
Treynor (1965) devised a performance measure by relating portfolio excess 
return to its systematic risk (P) through the CAPM equation. Treynor’s measure yields
13These measures, often referred to as the composite (risk-adjusted) measures of portfolio 
performance, mean that portfolio performance measures combine return and risk into one calculation.
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return per unit of systematic risk.14 This measure, a reward-to-volatility ratio (RVOL), 
provides a way to rate the performance of a fund’s investment managers. The slopes 
of characteristic lines decide performance rates among funds. The slope of the 
characteristic line measures the relative volatility of the fund's returns. The slope of 
this line-the P-coefficient-measures die volatility of the portfolio's returns in relation 
to those of the market index. Higher values of RVOL indicate better performance.
Jensen (1968) modified the characteristic regression line15 to make it useful as 
a one-parameter investment performance measure. Jensen’s measure focuses on 
detecting fond managers' superior ability in selectivity, represented by alpha (a), in a 
modified CAPM-based equation.16 A superior forecaster will tend to select
14Treynor's index ofportfolio performance, denoted \  for the p* portfolio is likely: — risk 
premium/ systematic risk = (rp where T  and Rf  are the average rate of return of portfolio p aid
risk-free rate, respectively. And jT is beta coe&cient of the portfolio.
15Sharpe (1963) developed a simplified model of portfolio analysis. While Sharpe called his 
model the "diagonal model" and others have occasionally referred to it as the "single index model,” it 
is now generally referred to as the "market model."
16Jensen's measure (1968, 1969) is based on die asset-pricing implications of the CAPM. If the 
CAPM is true and security rates of return are multivariate normal, then the expected return on any 
security (or portfolio), given the outcome of the market portfolio, is
Where P, =  covariance (RJt,Rmt)/f'ar(Rml), Rmt and R are the return on a market proxy and 
risk-free rate in period t, respectively.
Assuming that the asset pricing model is empirically valid, equation (2-2) says that the realized 
returns on any security (or portfolio) can be expressed as a linear function of its systematic risk, the 
realized returns on the market portfolio, the risk-free rate and a random error, eJt, which has an 
expected value of zero, where tilde denotes random variable.
(2-1)
(2-2)
By subtracting R« from both sides of equation(2-2), the excess return form
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underpriced securities; hence, the portfolio will earn more than the “normal” risk 
premium for its level of risk. Estimating a regression based on the superior forecasting 
ability of fond managers, therefore, generates a non-zero constant in the regression 
equation, hi this case, alpha simply indicates the vertical distance from the ex post 
CAPM. An alpha equal to zero indicates an equilibrium portfolio or asset. An alpha 
greater than zero creates a larger expected return than one would anticipate on the basis 
of the equilibrium relationship. An alpha less than zero signifies an overvalued 
security. The appraisal ratio refines Jensen's measure and equals the ratio of Jensen's 
a of the portfolio to the nonsystematic risk of the portfolio. It measures abnormal 
return per unit of risk that holding a market index portfolio could eliminate through 
diversification.
+  (2-3)
is obtained. The left-hand side of (2-3) is the risk premium earned on the j* security (or portfolio).
As long as the CAPM is valid, this risk premium is equal to Py(ifu -/?^  plus the random error
term e . Jensen's (1968, 1969) measure of mutual fund j's  performance for period (observation) t is
+.................................................................................................(2-4)
Where a >  0 indicates that the security (or portfolio) has yielded a return in period t greater 
than the return on a combined investment in the market portfolio and risk-free asset with the identical 
level of systematic risk. This is possible because of a superior forecasting abilty not available to others. 
Hence he will tend to systematically select securities which realize eJt > 0.
Therefore, Jensen (1968) allows for a nonzero constant in (2-4) by using the estimating equation
........................................................................ e-5)
Where the new error term £Jt will now have p., = 0, and should be serially independent (0, 
a2). Equation (2-5) is called in this paper the ’Ynodified CAPM-based equation." 05 is the performance 
measure, and Ps is assumed stationary. Thus if the portfolio manager has an ability to forecast security 
prices, the intercept, eCj in (2-5) will be positive.
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Jensen’s measure, however, has one crucial weak point: when applied to a 
multiperiod portfolio measure, it assumes a constant systematic risk through time to 
satisfy the assumptions of the estimating equation. However, this may directly conflict 
with the notion of a ‘‘managed” portfolio (Kon et al., 1979) because a mutual fund 
manager’s ability relates closely to timing ability. This, in turn, means a non-constant 
level of p, whereas Jensen's measure, "constant systematic risk," means a constant 
level of p.
At approximately the same time that Treynor developed his measure, Sharpe
(1966) also developed a way of measuring portfolio performance. Sharpe’s measure 
differs little from Treynor’s index, except that it divides the standard deviation of the 
portfolio return into the risk premium.17 Sharpe’s measure, called a reward-to- 
variability measure (RVAR), divides Jensen’s measure by the standard deviation of the 
return. It measures the excess return per unit of total risk. As with RVOL, the higher 
the RVAR, the better the portfolio performance.
However, Miller and Gehr (1978) found an upward bias in Sharpe's index, 
especially when it has a small (less than 50)sample size.18 Later, Jobson and Korkie
(1981) devised a statistical test (called a transformed difference) for measuring risk- 
adjusted performance. Sharpe's portfolio performance measure does not provide a
I7Sbarpe's measure divides average portfolio excess return over the sample period by the 
standard deviation of retumsover that period^It measures the reward to total volatility trade-off. $ = 
risk premium/total risk = (r - jn /a ^  where rf  =  average return from portfoliop, Rf  =  riskless rate of 
interest, and op — standard deviation of returns for portfolio p .
I8Tbis bias comes from Sharpe's sample variance estimator. For more detail, see Miller and 
Gehr (1978).
I
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statistical decision on performance superiority. It simply provides numerical value. 
However, this transformed Sharpe measure made it possible to provide statistical 
properties of the traditional Sharpe's measure when using it for comparisons. This 
transformed Sharpe measure proved beneficial even for small sample sizes.19
Jensen’s and Treynor’s measures can apply to any portfolio as well as to 
individual securities; Sharpe’s measure, however, applies only to purportedly efficient 
portfolios20 (Friend and Blume, 1970).21 This difference comes from their different 
mathematical derivations.22 Jensen’s measure and the other two differ in another way. 
Treynor's and Sharpe’s measures can apply to one-parameter portfolio rankings, 
whereas Jensen’s measure cannot because it measures only vertical deviations from the
19Fbr example, a Z statistic based on transformed differences for Sharpe's measure behaved wel 
even at small sample sizes. Jobson and Korkie (1981) devised a transformed Sharpe measure by 
employing Taylor series expansions for approximations of estimators. This measure exhibits increased 
statistical power when used for single comparisons. Chapter 5, the section on methodology, will deal 
in more detail with Jobson and Korlrie's transformed Sharpe measure.
20An efficient portfdstn-com.wpdolio has either the smallest portfolio risk for a given level of 
expected return or the largest expected return for a given level of risk. The efficient portfolio results 
from combining the risk-free asset and market portfolio (M) on the efficient set.
2lInvestors who have all (or substantially all) of their assets in a portfolio of securities should 
rely more on the Sharpe measure than the Treynor measure. Sharpe's measure assesses the portfolio's 
total return in relation to total risk, which includes any nonsystematic risk assumed by the investor. 
However, for those investors whose portfolio constitutes only a (relatively) small partof their total assets, 
systematic risk may well equal the relevant risk (Jones, 1996).
“ if portfolio i is an efficient portfolio, equation (2-1) in footnote 17 becomes
(E{Rm)-R/)/am=[E(.Ri)-Rfl/af ..................................................................................... (2-6)
because only in an efficient portfolio does p(/?,/?*) become one.
Equation (2-6) states that the excess return per unit of risk for an efficient portfolio equals the 
excess return per unit of risk for die market portfolio. The right-hand side of equation (2-6) is the Sharp 
index. This is a part of Sharpe's equation derivation. For more detail, see Sharpe (1964, 122) and 
Friend and Blume (1970, 563).
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characteristic regression line. However, with a completely diversified portfolio, all 
three measures agree on the ranking of portfolios. Many mutual fund studies for the 
last 20 years have used these three one-parameter performance measures.
Most of the theoretical and empirical research in the 1960s focused on the 
performance of micro forecasting portfolio managers (i.e., individual stock pickers). 
Those empirical studies sought to determine whether, overall, mutual fund managers 
achieved abnormal returns. They based their measurements on a mean-variance capital 
asset pricing model framework that expressed the one-period excess return on security 
i as in equation (2-5) in footnote 16.23 Alternatively, those researchers sought a 
structural specification that would measure investment performance and identify 
superior performers like Treynor and Sharpe (1966).
Much of the mutual fund research in the 1970s and 1980s focused on 
identifying details of abnormal returns rather than simply determining whether 
managers achieved above-normal returns from their investment portfolios. Investment 
portfolio research in the 1970's and 1980's tended to address one of the three following 
areas: (1) forecasts of price movements of selected individual stocks (i.e., “micro 
forecasting”), represented by a; (2) forecasts of price movements of the general stock 
market as a whole (i.e., “macro forecasting”), represented by P; and (3) P-constant.
“ Carlson (1970), Jensen (1968), Kon and Jen (1979), Mains (1977), McDonald (1974), and 
Sharpe (1966) are examples of research in this area.
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Since theories related to the first two areas related closely to each other, this section of 
the study discusses these two areas, and the next section discusses P-constant theories.
Timing and Sriwtion Ability 
A number of studies have investigated mutual fund performance by looking at 
selectivity and tuning.24 Those studies attributed superior performance to timing, 
selection ability, or some combination of the two.
Selection Ability
Security selectivity decisions involve the forecasting of price movements of 
individual common stocks. According to the security market line (SML) in the CAPM, 
the market has underpriced a security lying above the SML. For its level of risk, it has 
an expected return greater than that suggested by the SML as an “equilibrium” value. 
Similarly, the market has overvalued a security located below the SML. For its level 
of risk, it has a lower expected return than the corresponding CAPM “equilibrium” 
value. Therefore, the system tests superior ability in security selectivity by looking at 
the alpha distance as in (2-5) in footnote 17 above the SML in the CAPM. A positive 
or negative alpha of a portfolio results from regressing the excess return of the fund's 
portfolio against the excess return of the market portfolio. A portfolio manager with
^JenseaClfXiS, 1969), Kon and Jen (1979), Merton (1981), Henriksson and Merton(1981), Veit 
et al. (1982), Grant (1982), Kon (1983), Henriksson(1984), Chang and Lewellen (19840, Admati et al. 
(1986), Brinson et al. (1986), Jagaimathan and Korajczyk (1986), Breen and Jagannathan (1986)and Lee 
and Rahman (1990) all constructed research dealing with timing or selectivity or both.
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superior forecasting ability who tends to select securities located above the SML will 
earn more than the “normal” residual premium for the portfolio’s level of risk.
Allowance for such forecasting ability requires simply not constraining the 
estimating regression equation to pass through the origin. A nonzero constant in the 
market’s excess return regression creates a positive “alpha” in the excess return 
regression; the positive alpha indicates superior selectivity talent on the part of the fund 
manager. Most of this financial research utilized Jensen’s alpha (1966, 1968) measures.
Timing Ability
Market timing involves forecasting both general stock market price movements 
and interest rates. More accurately, timing involves shifting funds between a market 
index portfolio and a safe asset, such as Treasury bills (T-bills) or a money market 
fund. The alternative chosen will depend on whether the forecaster expects the market 
as a whole to outperform the safe asset. Additionally, it requires a decision to vary the 
total systematic risk of the portfolio in response to expectations concerning the size and 
direction of market price movements. Jensen (1968) suggested that a manager who 
(correctly) perceives a high probability that market returns will increase in the next 
period can increase portfolio return by increasing its risk. On the other hand, with an 
expectation of a down market, the manager can reduce losses by reducing the risk level 
of the portfolio. In the CAPM context, (3 manipulation represents timing ability.
The expected return of a portfolio depends on accurate estimates of not only 
each security’s ait but also each security’s p;. It also depends upon correct
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macroeconomic forecasts of average market rate of return (Aa)and risk-free rate (Rf). 
However, since the manager can forecast Rf with relatively high confidence, market 
timing basically refers to the average market rate of return forecast relative to the risk­
free rate. The beta of the portfolio for a manager engaged in market timing should 
increase in direct proportion to the quantity (Rm -Rp . This will, in turn, result in a 
greater expected return for the portfolio.
Alexander and Francis (1986) showed that a manager can change the beta of the 
portfolio in one of three ways. First, the manager can raise or lower the proportion of 
the portfolio invested in the risk-free asset, depending on the market forecast. Here the 
manager holds the relative composition of the risky portion of the portfolio fixed while 
allowing its overall proportion to vary in lockstep with alterations in the risk-free asset 
proportion (since the two proportions have to sum to 1). Second, while keeping 
constant the proportion of the portfolio invested in the risk-free asset, the manager can 
alter the composition of the portfolio’s risk. Given the goal of raising Pp, the manager 
can sell low-P stocks and replace them with high-p stocks. The third method for 
altering portfolio P simply utilizes some combination of the two previous methods.
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) pioneered the development of the curved 
characteristic line by adding a squared term to the usual linear index model. For 
example, an investor who can correctly predict bull and bear markets likely will shift 
more funds into the portfolio in the early part of a bull market. This shift in funds will 
make the portfolio characteristic line curve upward.
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Fama (1972) and Jensen (1972) developed theoretical structures for evaluating 
an investment manager’s micro- and macro-forecasting performance. A comparison 
between the ex post performance of the manager’s fund and market return provides a 
basis for that evaluation. Jensen (1972) developed a method for identifying the separate 
contributions of micro- and macro-forecasting. It requires an understanding of the 
market-timing forecast, the portfolio adjustment corresponding to that forecast, and the 
expected return on the market.
A number of researchers—Kon and Jen (1979), Admati et al. (1986), Henriksson 
and Merton (1981), Connor and Korajczyk (1986), and Lee and Rahman (1990) among 
others-have attempted to separate the micro-forecasting effects of investment managers 
from macro-forecasting for the market as a whole. Using the Quandt switching 
regression model and a CAPM framework, Kon and Jen (1979) examined the 
possibility of changing mutual fond portfolio market-related risk levels over time. They 
used a maximum likelihood test to separate their data sample into different risk 
regimes, and then they ran the standard regression equation for each such regime. 
They found evidence that many mutual funds had discrete changes in the level of 
market-related risk chosen. This finding agreed with the view that managers of such 
funds attempted to incorporate market timing into their investment strategies.
Admati et al. (1986) used the portfolio approach and the factor approach to 
dichotomize between timing ability and the ability to select individual assets. The 
portfolio approach restricts timing information to returns on a pre-specified set of 
timing portfolios. This approach excludes selectivity information relating to timing
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portfolio returns, but it includes information about some other asset returns. The factor 
approach utilizes timing information about the realization of factors that affect the 
returns of many assets, but it does not restrict this information to pre-specified timing. 
Selectivity under the factor approach allows for any specific determinants of individual 
asset returns without restriction.
Admati et al. (1986) developed two intuitive information characterizations:
(1) selectivity information statistically independent of returns on timing portfolios, and
(2) different types or coordinates of selectivity information applicable to different 
assets. Merton (1981) proposed an equilibrium theory of value for qualitative forecasts 
of whether stocks will outperform bonds. Based on Merton (1981), Henriksson and 
Merton (1981) presented statistical techniques for testing forecasting ability with a 
particular emphasis on the market-timing ability of investment managers. They 
presented both parametric and nonparametric tests of market-timing ability. The 
parametric tests require the assumption of either the CAPM or a multifactor return 
structure. Based strictly on observable returns, the tests permit identification of the 
separate contributions from market-timing ability and micro forecasting.
Other studies on timing and selectivity included Fabozzi and Francis (1979), 
Alexander and Stover (1980), and Lee and Rahman (1990). They all found at least 
some evidence that mutual fund portfolios do not maintain a constant risk posture over 
time, and they concluded that fund managers’ decision processes might include attempts 
at market timing.
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Testing timing ability for fund managers requires a time-series analysis based 
on specific performance data of institutional investors. As mentioned before, the test 
of timing ability includes the alteration of the proportion invested in a portfolio’s risky 
or safe assets. However, this study mainly focuses on measuring portfolio performance 
of all institutional investors' selection ability, based on portfolio simulation. The test 
of institutional investors’ timing ability lies beyond the scope of this study.
Beta (p) Analysis
Portfolio-P Constant
Most mutual fond performance evaluation research in the 1960s and early 1970s 
typically employed a one-parameter risk/return benchmark like that developed by 
Jensen (1968). Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), as well as Blume and Friend (1973), 
refined the analytical system. Such investigations effectively focused on fund 
managers’ security selection skills, and they assumed constant risk levels through time.
This assumption no longer suffices because mutual fonds with generally active 
management should have a changing level of systematic risk as a result of the buying 
and selling decisions of the fund managers. For example, a manager who can make 
better-than-average forecasts of future realizations on market factors will likely adjust 
to portfolio risk in anticipation of market movements. That manager can shift the 
overall risk composition of the portfolio in anticipation of broad market price 
movements. Kon and Jen (1978) regarded the risk level of a managed portfolio as a 
decision variable resulting from timing activities.
j
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This study assumes that institutional portfolio managers are limited to selecting 
stocks, not to timing the market. Managers' timing ability relates to beta-constant 
portfolios. However, the study of portfolio beta-constant lies beyond the scope of this 
study; this study assumes portfolio simulation at the individual stock's beta level rather 
than at the portfolio's beta level. From this point on, therefore, this study will discuss 
only literature concerning beta-constant individual securities.
Individual Stock-P Constant
Research often measures P, which represents systematic risk of an individual 
stock, by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to a time series of returns 
of that individual stock paired against the market. This OLS model assumes a constant 
beta through time in the regression expression. However, much research has attempted 
to determine whether the systematic risk of an individual firm’s stock remained 
constant. Much of this research has tested the constancy of common stocks’ betas. 
Although one study has found a stationary beta, most evidence has indicated 
nonstadonary Ps for individual securities. Examples of this work have included Blume 
(1971,197S), Fabozzi and Francis (1977,1978), Sunder (1980), Bey (1983), Lee and 
Chen (1982), and Ohlson and Rosenberg (1982).
The studies by Blume (1971, 1973) represented the pioneering work that first 
subjected the concept of a constant beta to close empirical scrutiny. Based on seven- 
year estimation periods, he found that beta tended to regress toward the grand mean of 
unity. For example, a portfolio which had an extremely high estimated beta in one
.1
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period tended to have a less extreme estimate in the following period. Blume concluded 
that portfolio betas remained stable over relatively long periods, and that individual 
stocks had unstable betas.
If a manager disregards non-constant betas in the risk-retum relationship, the 
resulting estimate of beta may provide misleading performance information. Managers, 
therefore, must pay attention to this beta constant. Previous research has developed 
several different stochastic parameter models for non-constant beta, particularly a 
random coefficient model and a first-order autoregressive process. The former model 
states that each period's beta for a given stock represents a normally distributed random 
variable with a mean of beta. The latter model tests for a first-order autocorrelation, 
or whether the error in period t  depends on the error in the preceding period. Fabozzi 
and Francis (1978), Lee and Chen (1980), Alexander and Benson (1982), and Lee 
(1982) used the random coefficient model. Sunder (1980) and Ohlson and Rosenberg
(1982) considered the first-order autoregressive model.
What causes a firm's systematic risk to change? Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes 
(1970) conducted much of the research in this area. Their research indicated that 
financial leverage changes, operating leverage, cash dividend yield, the degree of 
cyclicality of firm revenues, and earnings growth contributed to systematic beta 
changes. Rosenberg and Guy (1976a, 1976b) indicated that the change of beta may 
have arisen through the influence of either microeconomic or macroeconomic factors. 
They cited operational changes in the company or changes in the business environment 
peculiar to the company as possible microeconomic factors; they suggested the rate of
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inflation, general business conditions, and expectations about relevant future events as 
possible macroeconomic factors.
One study tested the hypothesis of constant beta coefficients. Brenner and Smidt 
(1977) tested a specific non-constant beta model against a constant beta model. Their 
study of 726 NYSE-listed securities supported the constant beta hypothesis.
The P-Return Relationship
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) developed the mean-variance 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Other investigators have published studies on the 
relationship between beta risk and average return in the securities markets; however, 
not many of the studies have demonstrated any significant relation between beta and 
average returns. Their beta risk represented the slope in the regression of a security’s 
return against the market’s return, given the efficient market portfolio viewpoint.
Friend et al. (1970) published the first important study on the beta-retum 
relationship. They studied 103 mutual fund performances based on the measure of risk 
theoretically most appropriate for investors taking advantage of market diversification 
opportunities. Their results showed a high positive correlation between mutual funds’ 
beta coefficients and average rates of return. Fama and Macbeth (1973) confirmed 
these results in a test of the relationship between return and risk for NYSE common 
stocks. Their study revealed a positive tradeoff between return and risk, as well as a 
linear relationship between a security’s portfolio risk and its expected return.
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Using monthly returns in the period 1960-1969, McDonald (1974) studied the 
risk and return relationship of 123 United States mutual funds. He found that the 
market-based portfolio fund line sloped more steeply than the market line. He 
concluded that high-beta funds generally “outperformed” low-beta funds for market- 
based portfolios of equal systematic risk.25 Additionally, he found a positive 
relationship between the market risk beta and average rate of return.
Some previous research has shown that beta risk and average rate of return do 
not always have positive correlations, especially in a declining market. Shawky (1982) 
found a negative correlation in the bear market risk-retum relationship of mutual funds. 
His results also showed that the slope of the risk-retum relationship strongly depended 
upon the market during the estimation period. A bull market or upward turn produced 
a positive slope; conversely, a bear market caused a negative slope.
The Fama and French (1992) study of the 1963-1990 period and the Kothari et 
al. (1993) study revealed a flat relationship between market beta and average return, 
even with beta as the only explanatory variable. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and 
Black (1993) contradicted these results.
Badrinath et al. (1989) found a positive relationship between CAPM betas and 
levels of institutional ownership. Holding a stock with a high beta increased the 
expected return if the portfolio outperformed the market. The high beta meant stock
^Friend, Blume, and Crockett, (1970, 36) found that high-risk funds performed better than 
lower-risk funds during the period studied. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) subsequently mentioned this 
finding.
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price volatility and that when the market rose, the price of a high-beta stock moved up 
even faster.
Even though portfolios with high beta stocks bear a “loss” in case o f sub-market 
performance, institutional managers prefer higher beta stocks to lower beta stocks. 
Despite their preferences for higher betas, institutional investors restrict their 
investment activities to the stocks of firms with large market values. Those firms have 
less-risky stocks than do firms with lower market values (Badrinath et al., 1989), and 
they reduce the potential magnitude of loss in case of sub-market performances.
Sias (1996) presented an opposite theory on the relationship between stock 
volatility and the institutional investor. Previous academic theory had argued that the 
higher betas of riskier securities attracted institutional investors. Sias argued that 
institutional investors played a destabilizing role in financial markets and that increases 
in institutional holdings resulted in increased volatility.
Firm Size and Institutional Holdings
The small-firm effect is a market efficiency-related anomaly. According to Banz 
(1981), the stocks of small NYSE firms tend to earn higher average risk-adjusted 
returns than the stocks of large NYSE firms. Banz (1981) found that both total and 
risk-adjusted rates of return tended to fall with increases in the relative size of the firm. 
This size effect appears to have persisted for over forty years.
Reinganum (1981), using a sample of both NYSE and AMEX firms, also found 
that returns on common stocks appeared to correlate negatively with the aggregate
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market values of the securities. Later studies-Keim (1983), Reinganum (1983), and 
Blume and Stambaugh (1983)-showed that this small-firm effect occurred almost 
entirely in the first two weeks of the year, thereby making it a “small-firm-in-January” 
effect (Bodieetal., 1996).
Why have small stocks provided higher risk-adjusted returns than large stocks, 
and why has the superior performance of small stocks occurred in January? Roll (1982) 
suggested that the small-firm effect might result from improper estimations of security 
betas. Roll said that standard beta estimates derived from daily data seriously 
understated the actual risk of a small firm. However, Reinganum’s research (1982) did 
not support Roll’s conjecture on the firm size effect. He concluded that although the 
direction of the bias in beta estimation agreed with Roll’s argument, the small-firm 
effect occurred nevertheless, even after controlling for trading frequency.
Another explanation of the small-firm effect came from liquidity theory as 
researched by Amihud and Mendelson (1989). They performed a joint test with all the 
variables-systematic risk (P), residual risk, size, and the bid-ask spread—hypothesized 
to affect expected returns. Their argument started with the proposition that the expected 
return increased with the asset’s systematic risk, residual risk, and market value; it 
decreased with the number of investors who had access to information about it and who 
invested in it. They found a highly significant bid-ask spread and a negligible size 
influence. Smaller stocks had larger bid-ask spreads, and the bid-ask spread dominated 
size in a joint test of the two variables' relationships to return. Size assumed
.i
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importance only because smaller stocks had lower liquidity, and, therefore, larger bid- 
ask spreads.
Keim (1983, 1986) and Roll (1983) found that roughly half of the size effect 
occurred in January, and more than half of the excess January returns occurred during 
the first five trading days of that January. The first trading day of the year showed a 
high small-firm premium in every year of the period studied. Ritter (1988) attributed 
this small-firm-in-January effect to income tax-related individual investor behavior. 
Individuals owned large proportions of small stocks, and, as the end of the year 
approached, they sold stocks held at a loss in order to receive a tax benefit. They 
reinvested in January, creating buying pressure that pushed the prices of small stocks 
upward. The low buy/sell ratio for individual investors in late December and the high 
buy/sell ratio early in the following January provided evidence of this pattern.
R&D Expenditure and Institutional Holdings 
As institutional investors increased their percentage ownership of the voting 
stock of publicly traded companies, they influenced these firms’ operations (Pozen, 
1994). Stock analysts have sought to determine whether publicly traded companies’ 
R&D expenditures have undergone any systematic changes and whether those changes 
have influenced stock prices. Three mutually exclusive viewpoints evolved concerning 
the effects of R&D expenditures (Kochhar and David, 1996). The first view (Drucker 
1986, Mitroff 1987) treated institutional investors as “myopic” investors looking for 
short-term gains from their equity investments. The second view considered institutions
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as interested in long-term gains from their investments, so these investors sought and 
invested in more innovative firms. Allen (1993), Jarrell et al. (1985), and Jensen 
(1988) supported this perspective. The third view (Aold 1984, Taylor 1990, Useem 
1993) considered that the large holdings of these investors provided them with an 
incentive to monitor firm managers and influence firm actions if necessary. Thus, self- 
interest motivated institutional investors to use their “voice” to influence managerial 
decisions, with the goal of increasing firm value.
The view that institutions invested for short-term gains received extensive 
support during the late 1980s. However, increasing levels of institutional ownership 
made it difficult for institutions to simply follow an “exit” policy of selling a stock 
when dissatisfied with its performance. This policy entailed increasingly more expense 
as institutions bad to accept substantial discounts in order to liquidate their significant 
holdings (Coffee, 1991). The enormous level of assets controlled by institutions made 
efficient movement in and out of stock positions increasingly difficult (Nussbaum et al., 
1987). Those movements would entail commissions when liquidating positions at lower 
prices and still more commissions when reinvesting the proceeds. Institutional 
investors, therefore, started involving themselves in corporate strategy. The last two 
theories-explaining how institutional investors acted as long-term investors-have 
recently gained more acceptance than the first one, the "myopic theory" (Kochhar and 
David, 1996; Hansen and Hill, 1991).
J
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Summ ary
Several theories have appeared in the literature to explain the evaluation of 
mutual fund performance. EMH, timing and selection ability, beta constant, beta- 
retum relationship, firm size effect, and level of R&D expenditures each have offered 
insights into the causal factors creating excess returns for institutional investors' 
portfolios. The next chapter will review previous empirical studies in those areas.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
!CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
IntnHhKftffl
This chapter reviews relevant empirical studies. Section one examines literature 
on mutual fund performance. Section two examines the evidence concerning beta 
effects on portfolio performances. The first part deals with the beta constant relation 
to the systematic risk of a firm, and the second part deals with the beta-retum 
relationship. Section three reviews evidence concerning the effect of firm size on 
return analysis. The final section reviews empirical evidence that seeks to explain 
relationships between levels of institutional holdings and R&D expenditures.
Mutual Funds Perform ance 
As institutional holdings of corporate stocks have increased, a number of 
researchers have attempted to evaluate the performance of institutional portfolios. No 
clear consensus has been attained about performance evaluation. Some researchers 
have concluded that actively managed mutual funds outperformed index funds, while 
others have judged that index funds outperformed mutual funds. The latter opinion 
appears to have more acceptance.
42
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Mutual funds tend to perform less efficiently than market indexes because of 
load fees, management fees, brokerage fees, and unreasonably established benchmarks 
for comparisons. A summary evaluation of mutual fund performance follows.
Most early researchers-including Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966), and Jensen 
(1968,1969)-utilized a one-parameter risk-adjusted measurement of portfolio manager 
performance. These researchers presumed that those managers acted as 
microforecasters, or individual stock pickers. The early investigators searched for 
evidence of superior mutual fond investment performance in terms of individual stock 
selection ability. Their common results revealed that mutual funds performed below 
the benchmark portfolio, or the naive portfolio strategy. Sharpe found a lower (0.34) 
reward-to-volatility (RVOL) ratio26 for his sample than for the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index. Jensen found a -.011 average value of alpha, calculated net of expenses. This 
indicated that the funds earned about 1.1% less per year (compounded continuously) 
than they should have earned, given their level of systematic risk.
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) introduced a nonlinear version of CAPM to test for 
market timing ability. In the standard CAPM regression equation, a portfolio’s return 
has a linear relationship with the market return. However, Treynor and Mazuy argued 
that a manager who could forecast market returns would hold a greater proportion of 
the market portfolio in stocks with a high return. Their portfolio return exhibited a 
convex relationship to the market return. Their study showed no statistical evidence
^TlVAR ratio = (average return - 3.0%)/variability. For mote defeil, see Sharpe (1966, 125).
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that investment managers of any of fifty-seven open-end mutual funds successfully 
outperformed the market.
Soon after publication of the one-parameter measure, Friend, Blume, and 
Crocket (1970) studied 103 mutual funds for the 1960-1968 period. They applied a 
risk-class approach27 to overcome the bias inherent in the one-parameter risk-adjusted 
approach.28 Their results also confirmed previous findings. Their random portfolios 
of NYSE stocks performed better on average than did mutual funds with equal 
investment in each stock and in the same risk class. Friend et al. (1970) attributed the 
inferior performance of mutual funds to unreasonably established benchmarks plus the 
effects of both mutual fund management fees and commissions.
McDonald (1974), Mains (1977), and Kon and Jen (1979) used the one- 
parameter model with data from the late 1950s and the 1960s in studying the investment 
performance of mutual fund management. Although some individual funds performed 
in a superior manner, the mutual fund sample showed neither significantly “superior” 
nor significantly “inferior” performance. Kim (1977) found a negative relationship
27This approach generated random portfolios of various sizes with equal dollar weights or with 
market value weights at the beginning of the evaluation period. It held such portfolios to the end of the 
evaluation period. To evaluate the performance of managed funds, it classified both the random 
portfolios and managed portfolios by predetermined risk classes.
In each risk class, it compared y (the mean return on the managed portfolios) to that on the 
random benchmark portfolios in order to determine which group performed better (Kim, 1978).
28The risk-adjusted benchmark portfolio approach tended t> evaluate unfavorably the funds which 
assumed risk greater than the market portfolio in some periods and the reverse in other periods. This 
effect occurred because the benchmark portfolios, generated by applying realized return data to the 
CAPM, tended to produce "unreasonably" high returns for the muual funds with above-average risk and 
"unreasonably” low returns for the funds with below-average risk (Friend and Blume [1970] as cited in 
Kim [1978, 387]). See Friend and Blume (1970) for details.
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between risk and return. The reverse fond relationship is attributed to managers who 
had invested too much in risky growth stocks during the bear market.
Research on mutual funds during the 1980s shifted from evaluating overall 
performance to understanding the details of superior performance. Many of those 
studies examined the market-timing performance of mutual fond managers.
Jensen’s Alpha Measure (1966, 1968) prepared the foundation for most of the 
research about mutual fund manager selection skills. Jensen (1968) argued that if a 
manager successfully predicted market movements and altered portfolio compositions 
appropriately, the portfolio risk estimate is forced downward and the associated 
measure of risk-adjusted performance (alpha hat) is forced upward. Grant (1977) 
reexamined Jensen’s contention. He explained how market-timing actions affected 
selection-ability empirical test results. His research (1977) reversed Jensen’s argument 
that as upwardly biased estimates of least-squares estimators of beta, performance 
estimates are biased downwardly. By ignoring timing, the previous researcher had 
biased portfolio alpha estimates downward. Grant traced that timing-related downward 
bias to a mathematical error in Jensen’s report and a conceptual problem involved in 
Jensen's (1968) work. He showed that market-timing made the portfolio alpha’s 
regression estimate a downward-biased measure of excess returns resulting from micro 
forecasting ability. Chang and Lewellen (1984), Henriksson (1984), and Lee and 
Rahman (1990) supported Grant’s findings.
Financial researchers, nevertheless, continued to employ Jensen measures. 
Lehmann and Modest (1987) examined monthly-returns data for 130 mutual funds over
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the January 1968 through December 1982 period. They utilized Jensen’s measures to 
determine the sensitivity of inferences about performance to the benchmark chosen to 
measure normal performance. Their study did not determine whether mutual funds 
achieved abnormal performance. However, the measures of abnormal mutual fund 
performance showed considerable sensitivity to the benchmark chosen to measure 
normal performance.29 Grinblatt and Titman (1989) used Jensen’s measures to identity 
mutual fund managers who exhibited superior stock selection abilities. They studied 
quarterly equity holdings data for a large sample of mutual funds that operated derring 
part or all of the 1975-1984 period. Like Lehmann and Modest, they concluded that 
abnormal return measurement benchmarks influenced performance evaluations. 
Although some fund managers turned out to be superior performers, high operating 
expenses offset superior performance. Their actual returns, therefore, did not exhibit 
abnormal performance.
Lee and Rahman (1990) employed the Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer model based 
upon Jensen measures (1972). They produced no evidence of overall superior micro 
fund manager ability, except at the individual fund level.
29However, an early study by Peterson and Rice (1980) says the choice of an index or measure 
does not appear to affect the relative rankings of the portfolios. Peterson and Rice calculated quarterly 
returns for 15 mutual funds over two five-year observation periods, 1967-1971 and 1972-1976. They 
utilized four proxies for the market portfolio: the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Stock Index, and two indices representing an equal-weighted and a value-weighted index of all NYSE- 
listed common stocks. Peterson and Rice found that for the Treynor measure, choice of market proxy 
made little difference in ranking the performance of the portfolios.
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P Analysis
Beta Constant
Much past research has tested hypotheses about the instability of common 
stock’s systematic risk, by beta. Many of the tests used ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression estimates of individual stock risks over consecutive time segments. In most 
cases, least-squares beta estimates, which represented individual common stock market 
risk levels, used either a market model (i.e., an actual) or a revised traditional CAPM 
(i.e., an expectation) in a standard linear regression model.
The latter model originally represented the expected one-period return of any 
security or portfolio, given its level of systematic risk beta. Empirical applications of 
the CAPM required additional assumptions (a statistical generating process) for actual 
rates of return. Fama (1968) and Jensen (1968) provided a framework for applying the 
expected single-period model of CAPM to ex post multiperiod returns. This process 
yielded a result approximately equal to the coefficient beta (pj) in the “market model” 
given by:
y=i,2,....jv
where the “Pj” parameter may have varied from security to security, an unobservable 
“market factor”, xt , (to some extent) affecting returns on all securities, and N 
representing the total number of securities in the market (Jensen, 1968).
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Blume (1971) conducted the first reported study of beta stability. He found a 
product moment correlation of .63 for single securities for two time periods (July 1926 
through June 1933, and July 1933 through June 1940).30 Levy (1971) used monthly 
prices and successive seven-year periods to examine the longer-term stability of the beta 
coefficient. He observed unstable betas of individual stocks, and warned that past betas 
for individual securities did not provide good estimates of future risk. Fabozzi and 
Francis (1978), Kon and Jen (1979), Sunder (1980), Ohlson and Rosenberg (1982), Lee 
and Chen (1982), Kon (1983), Bos and Newbold (1984), Simonds et al. (1986), Collins 
et al. (1987), and Rahman et al. (1987) researched systematic risk (P) stability for 
individual securities.
Fabozzi and Francis (1978) used monthly returns of NYSE stocks traded from 
196S to 1971 to examine the beta coefficient stability. They concluded that individual 
security betas moved randomly, while the OLS31 beta acted as an invariant point 
estimate over the sample period. Bos and Newbold studied stability of systematic risk 
during the 1970s and found results similar to Fabozzi and Francis; they used monthly 
return data of NYSE-listed stocks and observed strong random systematic risk.
Kon and Jen studied the beta stability of individual stocks contained in portfolios 
of 49 mutual funds. They used Quandt’s switching regression model and monthly
30This correlation suggested that assessments for individual securities derived from historical data 
could explain roughly 36 percent of the variation in the future estimated values leaving about 64 percent 
unexplained (Blume, 1971).
3'By definition, the OLS method estimates the average slope, and also by definition, that average 
is invariant over the data range.
.1
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return data from the 1960-1971 period; they found that 27 of 49 funds showed multiple 
regimes and that 6 funds showed 3 regimes. Kon (1983) tested 1960-1976 data for 
mutual funds and found the same non-constant beta of individual funds.
Sunder used 1926 to 1975 monthly return rates for NYSE stocks in testing 
individual stock market risk. He had mixed results. The beta coefficient followed a 
random walk over time, and it followed an autoregressive process. The average non­
constant level varied from high during the 1926 to 1950 period to low during the 1963 
to 1975 period. Ohlson and Rosenberg (1982), as well as Sunder (1980), used NYSE- 
traded common stocks to test individual stock stability. They discovered a tendency for 
betas to converge rather slowly toward a norm (the stationary mean) as well as a 
stationary first-order autoregressive process that produced wide divergences about the 
mean value. Most of the studies used monthly-based rates of return.
Collins et al. (1987) used NYSE and AMEX weekly return data for 500 
individual securities and for several different time intervals within the 1962-81 period. 
As previous researchers have proved, they observed stochastic variation in the beta risk 
of equity securities. Their findings are quite persuasive for 10-year estimation periods 
and persist for estimation periods as short as 5 years.
Brenner and Smidt (1977) found support of the constant beta coefficient 
hypothesis. Alternative specific non-stationary beta coefficients implied a constant 
absolute amount of risk.32 Their study consisted o f762 NYSE-listed stocks with CRSP
32Their model used the following relation between the beta of a security and the value-V of the 
underlying asset
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data for 120 consecutive months ending in June, 1968. They developed and used four 
specific comparative CAPM-based market models and applied Chow Test coefficient 
equality in two time periods. They compared the two null hypotheses: constant relative 
risk and constant absolute risk. Brenner and Smidt found no dramatic difference 
between the two hypotheses; the slight difference that they found tended to favor the 
constant beta coefficient hypothesis. Brenner and Smidt interpreted the difference as 
meaning that the market models incorrectly specified the data generating process.
The B-Return and p-Institutional 
Holding Relationships
Early CAPM studies supported a positive relationship between beta risk and 
average rate of return. Recent studies, however, have not supported that relationship. 
Black, Jensen, and Scholes (BJS, 1972) investigated the relationship between risk and 
return. They used 1931 through 1965 monthly returns from nearly all NYSE stocks. 
Their findings supported the traditional form of the CAPM relationship: the higher the 
portfolio p, the larger the portfolio excess return. The most volatile and least volatile 
portfolios had 1.56 and .5 betas, respectively; their corresponding portfolios had 
monthly returns of 2.13 and .91 respectively.
p = B/v
where B represents the risk of the real asset, and p measures the amount of risk per dollar of value. The 
quantity of B measures the absolute amount of risk associated with the asset. If the absolute amount of 
risk associated with the asset remains constant when the value of the asset changes, beta will vary in 
inverse proportion to variations in the value of the asset (Brenner and Smidt, 1977).
J
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Fama and MacBeth (1973) examined the risk-retum relationship of CAPM 
from 1935 to 1968. They regressed monthly returns for twenty portfolios against the 
values of explanatory variables. Their study provided evidence of a positive 
relationship between systematic risk and the rate of return. Fama and MacBeth 
produced a significant market premium for the entire study period.
Recently, Fama and French (1992) proclaimed beta’s death; they could discern 
no relationship between market beta and average return. Their sample included all 
nonfinancial firms in the combined NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ return files. They 
merged CRSP and COMPUSTAT annual income-statement and balance-sheet data for 
the 1963 to 1990 period. They formed ten portfolios based upon the ranked market 
betas of stocks. They concluded that the highest beta portfolio had the lowest average 
return, and that the highest average returns occurred in the third beta portfolio.
Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) sought to determine whether annual beta 
explained cross-sectional variations in average returns over three different study periods 
between 1927 and 1990. They presented evidence of substantial ex post compensation 
for beta risk over the 1941 - 1990 period and even more over the 1927 - 1990 period. 
Consistent with evidence in Fama and French, they found weak estimated risk 
premiums for the 1963 -1990 subperiod; they saw no relationship between beta risk 
and average return over the relatively short period of time. Although they used 
monthly return data for average returns, they applied annual estimates of beta to reduce 
the size effect coming from the small-firm January effect.
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Using 1931 - 1965 data, Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) observed higher 
monthly returns for low-risk NYSE stocks than the CAPM would predict. McDonald 
(1974), however, found that high-beta funds outperformed low-beta funds in a study 
based on 123 American mutual funds during the 1960 - 1969 study period.
Using a 1977 - 1991 sample of all securities listed on the NYSE, Sias (1996) 
investigated the relationship between volatility and institutional holdings of corporate 
stocks. He found that institutional investors played a destabilizing role in financial 
markets. He concluded that increased institutional holdings of corporate stocks 
preceded increased individual stock volatility. Sias regressed the natural logarithm of 
volatility in each year against the change in institutional holdings in the previous year. 
The coefficient associated with changes in institutional holdings proved positive (and 
significant at the 5% level) in every year.
Firm Size and Institutional Holdings
Most of the fourteen previous studies proved a firm-size effect in one or both 
of these ways: (1) they found an inverse relationship between average rate of return and 
corporate market values (Brown et al., 1983), or (2) they found a linear relationship 
between the two (Banz, 1981). Most of that research showed that the firm-size effect 
occurred in January.
Banz (1981) studied the empirical relationship between returns and total market 
values of NYSE common stocks. He used the monthly returns of all NYSE stocks
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from 1926 to 197S. Banz found that smaller firms had higher risk-adjusted returns than 
medium size portfolio returns or the largest portfolio.
Reinganum (1981) stated that the firm size effect resulted from either 
misspecified CAPM or inefficient capital markets. Reinganum used quarterly and 
annual earnings data for 566 NYSE and AMEX stocks traded in 1976 and 1977. He 
attributed persistent abnormal returns to the misspecified equilibrium pricing model. 
He traced those abnormal returns to flaws in the capital asset pricing model, rather than 
to informational inefficiencies.
Roll (1981) argued that part of the observed risk-adjusted excess returns related 
to size resulted from improper estimations of security betas, rather than to inadequate 
empirical representation of capital market equilibrium. Reinganum (1982), however, 
did not support that argument. Reinganum based his research on NYSE and AMEX 
trading data, and he used average daily returns from the 1964 - 1978 study period. 
Then he used monthly and quarterly returns to estimate betas. The estimated daily 
return beta of the small firm portfolio produced a 1.69 coefficient, while it produced 
1.47 and 2.0 coefficients, respectively, for quarterly and monthly data. He proved that 
misestimation of beta could not explain the firm size effect.
Banz, Brown et al. (1983) tested firm size effect using all stocks traded on the 
NYSE and AMEX from 1976 to 1978.33 They found a linear size effect between mean 
returns and firm size.
33For details, see Brown et al. (1983, 40).
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A great deal of research has sought to determine potential explanations of 
stochastic size effects. Keim (1983) used CRSP daily files for all securities traded on 
the NYSE an AMEX from 1962 to 1978. He discovered that daily abnormal return 
distributions in January had larger means relative to the remaining eleven months, and 
he noticed a more pronounced size effect in January than in any other month. He 
introduced a tax loss selling hypothesis to explain this phenomenon. Lakonishok and 
Shapiro (1986), Jaffe et al. (1989), Ritter and Chopra (1989), Leong and Zaima (1991), 
and Elfakhani (1993)-among others—corroborated the January small firm effect.
No published work on the relationship between institutional holdings of 
corporate stocks or mutual fund performance and firm size effect was found. However, 
Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) studied portfolio performance in terms of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and the size effect. They designed their 
study to see whether portfolios of firms with high managerial ownership outperformed 
portfolios of firms with low managerial ownership. According to their study, the 
smallest firm portfolio earned a significant positive abnormal return of .8% per month; 
the largest value firm portfolio earned a significant negative .2% abnormal return per 
month. They agreed that the small-firm effect did influence abnormal returns. 
However, the level of managerial ownership did not appear to have an effect on 
portfolio returns; portfolios constructed to control for the size effect exhibited risk- 
adjusted returns unrelated to the degree of managerial ownership.
Most of the financial analysts who tried to isolate superior ability and above­
normal rates of return limited the scope of their research to fund managers' stock
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selection abilities and market timing abilities. (Stock selection ability consisted of 
selecting stocks of small firms which outperform the market, selecting stocks with high 
betas which outperform the market, and other factors.)
R&D Expenditure and Institutional 
Holdings
Sias (1996) argued that institutional ownership increased stock price volatility, 
while others (Dobrzynski et al., 1986; Drucker, 1986) suggested that it induced a 
myopic short-term management orientation. Past institutional investor evaluations 
generally centered on financial performance measures (Graves and Waddock, 1990). 
Institutional investment managers, therefore, attempted to influence short-run strategies 
of companies in their portfolios. Graves (1988) studied institutional investor-R&D 
spending relationships for twenty-two computer manufacturing companies. He found 
a negative relationship between R&D expenditures and institutional ownership; high 
levels of institutional ownership may have suppressed R&D spending in the computer 
industry. Because of intense pressure to produce short-term earnings, institutional 
investors likely influenced companies in their portfolios to avoid major long-term 
investments such as R&D expenditures. They simply considered themselves traders, 
not investors, and they eagerly sold stocks for quick profits (Dobrzynski, 1986). As 
the levels of institutional ownership have increased, annual stock turnover rates34 have
tu rn o v er equals the fraction of a firm’s capital traded on a given day as measured by the price on 
day t, multiplied by the volume on day t, and then normalized by dividing by year-end capitalization.
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also increased dramatically, from 16% in 1965 to 54% in 1985 (Graves and Waddock, 
1990).
Management literature has attributed declining innovation, poor productivity 
growth, and a loss of international competitiveness (Scherer 1984 and Ttaurow 1985) 
to institutional investors' orientation toward short-term profits. Institutional investors 
now recognize the folly of that orientation and the “exit” policy of dumping a given 
stock because of dissatisfaction with managerial performance. The cost of such a 
practice has increased greatly because they have had to accept substantial discounts in 
order to liquidate their significant holdings (Aoki, 1984). Institutions now own more 
than 50% of U.S. equities (Mallin, 1995); their investment managers now must concern 
themselves with both short-term and long-term results.
Recent studies by Hansen and Hill (1991) and Kochhar and David (1996) 
showed a significant positive relationship between institutional holdings and both long­
term investment and R&D expenditures. Hansen and Hill used 129 firms in four 
research-intensive industries over a ten-year period. Kochhar and David used 1989 
financial data for 135 manufacturing firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ. The results indicated that institutions did not foster short-term orientation 
and that they may have influenced firms to increase innovation.
Heiner (1983) posited another reason for the positive relationship between R&D 
spending and institutional holdings. His theory-referred to as the competence- 
difficult gap (the C-D gap)-explained the ability of shareholders to make rational 
decisions concerning share value. The gap measured the spread between an economic
i
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actor's competence to make a rational decision and the difficulty of the decision 
problem. Individual shareholders had a wider gap than did institutions. Hansen and 
Hill (1991) explained that individual shareholders had a limited ability to make difficult 
decisions in a complex environment characterized by substantial noise. This gap theory 
suggested that the wider C-D gap may have led to buy and sell decisions on the basis 
of short-term earnings. Since institutions systematically processed information better 
than individuals, the decisions of institutional investors probably led to more nearly 
rational decisions oriented toward long-term investments.
Summary
Sharpe's measure, still frequently used by financial researchers, will be applied 
to test the selection ability of institutional investors. Then, as factors affecting the 
selection ability of institutional investors, the CAPM based B-retum relationship, the 
firm-size effect, and R&D expenditures will be studied to ascertain whether they exhibit 
any relationship with institutional investors' excess returns. The CAPM based beta- 
retum relationship is one of the top issues currently being discussed by financial 
analysts. The relationship between beta and rate of return will be tested in this study.
The next chapter discusses the five hypotheses addressed in this study. Previous 
empirical research has not specifically analyzed these formal hypotheses.
j
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fCHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESES 
Introduction
Since the 1930s institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and 
investment counselors, have acquired increased concentrations of publicly traded 
stocks. Even though investors could have done better by buying index funds, the size 
of institutional investors has continued to grow each year.
Gruber (1996) developed a clientele behavior classification system to explain 
this phenomenon. He classified one group as "sophisticated" clientele and the other as 
"disadvantaged” clientele. The sophisticated group directs its money to funds based on 
performance. He divided disadvantaged clientele into three sub-groups: 
(1) unsophisticated investors, (2) institutionally disadvantaged investors, and (3) tax 
disadvantaged investors. Gruber concluded that unsophisticated investors directed their 
money to funds based at least in part on other influences, such as advertising and advice 
from brokers. Disadvantages institutional investors consisted of pension accounts 
which contained assets that underperformed. Tax disadvantaged investors held funds 
until capital gains taxes made liquidation infeasible. This group could have acted as 
sophisticated investors in placing new money.
58
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As yet, no one has analyzed the ability of institutional investors to collectively 
earn abnormal returns. Investors need to know whether a stock portfolio with a high 
level of institutional investor ownership will show a greater return than one with a 
lower level of institutional investor ownership. They also need to know whether the 
the small-firm effect theory still applies to the evaluation of institutional investors.
Following are five hypotheses relating to return characteristics for institutional 
investors. The investigation includes cross-sectional analysis of institutional investment 
portfolio equity returns.
Hypothesis!
These tests will examine gross returns that have no transaction costs, fees, or 
other expenses. Different institutional investors have different transaction costs or fees, 
and this test utilizes portfolios formed by several criteria that make it difficult to trace 
stock ownership to institutional investors.
Hoi: Mean risk-adjusted excess returns of stock portfolios do not correlate
positively with institutional investor concentration percentages.
Hoi: Mean risk-adjusted excess returns of stock portfolios have a positive
correlation with institutional investor concentration percentages.
Hypothesis 1 addresses the first purpose of this study. It attempts to determine 
whether portfolios with higher concentrations of institutional investors exhibit greater 
return rates than those with lower holdings. It also attempts to ascertain whether they 
systematically produce returns above those estimated by the CAPM.
i
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Rejection of null Hypothesis 1 will imply that stock portfolios with high 
concentrations of institutional investors exhibited different risk-adjusted rates of return 
than those with low holdings by institutional investors. Higher risk-adjusted rates of 
return may indicate that the institutional investors had superior selection ability. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis will indicate that institutional investors collectively 
did not evaluate investments any better than other investors. Some institutional 
investors may have done better while others did worse.
Hypothesis 2-fltelated to P Risk)
Ho2: Stock portfolios with higher p risk do not exhibit greater risk-adjusted
abnormal rates of return than those with lower P risk for market-based 
portfolios of equal systematic risk.
Ht2: Stock portfolios with higher P risk exhibit greater risk-adjusted
abnormal rates of return than those with lower beta risk for market- 
based portfolios of equal systematic risk.
Hypothesis 2 (null and alternative) addresses the second purpose of this study. 
It attempts to determine whether stock portfolios with higher market risks, represented 
by higher Ps, produced higher rates of return than those with lower p risks as implied 
by the CAPM. Testing this hypothesis will indicate whether the compensation for 
systematic risk equaled or exceeded the market rate of return less the risk-free rate (rm - 
rf), as stated by the CAPM. This excess returns test will determine whether high-p 
stock portfolios systematically earned more than the required return estimated by the 
CAPM. It examines the relationship between p and mean excess return. Ultimately,
j
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the test of this hypothesis will determine the appropriateness of the stock risk measure,
P-
Rejection of null Hypothesis 2 will lead to the conclusion that institutional 
investors manifested their superior ability by selecting stocks with a higher p. It could 
mean that institutional investors required a higher return for holding a stock with a 
larger p, which would suggest that institutional investors considered the P factor a 
useful mol in forecasting security risks. It could also mean that P played an important 
role in stock pricing.
Hypothesis 3 (Related to Volatility)
Ho3: Stock portfolios with higher volatility do not exhibit greater or less rates
of return than those with lower volatility.
H„3: Stock portfolios with higher volatility exhibit greater or less rates of
return than those with lower volatility.
Hypothesis 3 (null and alternative) addresses the third purpose of this study.
It attempts to ascertain whether stock portfolios with higher volatility produced higher
rates of return than those with lower volatility.
The CAPM implies that in a well-diversified portfolio, portfolio returns relate
to systematic risk only. The market compensates only systematic risk (P). With an
exactly true CAPM, unsystematic risk will make a zero contribution to portfolio
returns. The relationship between return and risk based on the CAPM is not always
consistent with the CAPM's prediction. Miller and Scholes (1972) found an apparent
association between high unsystematic risk and higher realized returns.
ij
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Testing this hypothesis will measure the validity of the compensation for P risk 
implied by the CAPM. Second, this hypothesis will indicate the relative investment 
behavior aggressiveness or conservatism of institutional portfolio managers.
Rejection of Hypothesis 3 will lead to the conclusion that institutional investors 
manifested their superior ability by selecting stocks with a higher volatility, and 
requiring a higher return. It could suggest that institutional investors considered the 
volatility factor as a useful tool in forecasting risk of securities, and that volatility 
played an important role in stock pricing.
Hypothesis 4 (Related to Firm Size Effect)
H04: Stock portfolios composed of small firms' stocks do not exhibit greater
risk-adjusted rates of return than those composed of large firms' stocks, 
ceteris paribus.
H,4: Stock portfolios composed of small firms' stocks exhibit greater risk-
adjusted rates of return than those composed of large firms' stocks, 
ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 4 addresses die fourth purpose of this study, determining the 
correlation between stock portfolios composed of small-firm stocks and risk-adjusted 
abnormal rates of return.
This phase of the study will test whether institutional investments in stocks of 
small firms earned abnormal returns. Earlier empirical studies had found that small 
firms yielded higher average returns than large firms of equal risk. In other words, 
average rates of return and firm size are related inversely and linearly. This study will
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use total asset as the measure of firm size. Tests of these hypotheses will include an 
exploration of the January firm size effect.
Failure to reject Null Hypothesis 4 will lead to the conclusion that institutional 
investors benefitted by cautiously including small firm stocks in their portfolios. This 
will imply a measure of the small-firm effect in institutional investment.
Hypothesis 5-A (Related to R&D Expenditures)
Ho5a: Firms' R&D expenditures and institutional stock ownership percentages 
do not correlate.
Ha5a: Firms' R&D expenditures and institutional stock ownership percentages 
have a positive correlation.
Hypothesis S-B (Related to R&D Expenditures)
HoSb: Stock portfolios with higher R&D expenditures and higher
concentrations of institutional investors do not exhibit greater risk-
adjusted rates of return than those with less R&D expenditures and 
lower concentrations of institutional investors, ceteris paribus.
Ht5b: Stock portfolios with higher R&D expenditures and higher
concentrations of institutional investors exhibit greater risk-adjusted
rates of return than those with less R&D expenditures and lower 
concentrations of institutional investors, ceteris paribus.
Hypotheses S-a and 5-b address the final purpose of this study, determining the 
correlation between firms' R&D spending and increasing institutional stock holdings.
This study will test whether the different levels of institutional shareholdings 
are related to a firm's R&D expenditure. There are two possible reasons that 
institutional investors choose those firms with higher R&D. First, firms with higher
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R&D had greater returns; or institutional investors influenced managerial decisions that 
increased firm value.
Failure to reject both null Hypotheses 5-A and 5-B would lead to the conclusion 
that institutional investors had a long-term innovation-oriented motivation, rather than 
a short-term-profit-oriented one. The acceptance of both null hypotheses would 
preclude a definitive conclusion, and it would necessitate other experiments to explain 
the different relationship. Failure to reject Hypothesis 5-A, coupled with rejection of 
Hypothesis 5-B, would indicate that institutional investors had strong incentives to 
monitor firm activities and continuously influence managers so as to increase firm 
values.
Institutional Portfolio Performance Joint Effect Test 
Finally, this study will test the effect of those five variables, as a whole, on the 
portfolio performance. This is done to develop a decision model for institutional 
investors' extra return in order to discover if there is a significant relationship between 
portfolio returns and the five variables used in this study. The dependent variable is 
the monthly mean return, based on the institutional ownership information. The 
indepen-dent variables are these explanatory variables: institutional ownership, beta, 
volatility, total assets, and R&D expenditures.
If the multiple regression model is statistically significant, it gives rise to a 
decision model for institutional investors' portfolio selection. With joint tests, it is also
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possible to see which variables are positively or negatively related to institutional 
portfolio return.
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rCHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
Ownership and control of U.S. corporations has increasingly shifted from 
individuals to various intermediary institutional investors acting on behalf of their 
constituents. Pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and commercial banks, 
have assumed an important role among these growing intermediaries.
Increased levels of corporate stock holdings by these intermediaries have created 
the opportunity for research on the behavior of institutional investor portfolio managers. 
Much previous research has focused on mutual fund portfolio performances in terms of 
managers’ timing and selection abilities. However, that research has not determined what 
constituted those superior selection and timing abilities. This research has attempted to 
ascertain whether institutional investment portfolio managers possessed a superior stock 
selection ability.
Based on selection ability, this research evaluates performance attributes of 
institutional portfolio managers. The role of the five following attributes related to 
institutional investors are investigated. These are the small stock firm, January, beta, 
volatility, and R&D expenditures effects. An investment strategy based on any or all of
66
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these attributes are related to portfolio rates of return. This chapter describes the sample 
selection criteria and the methodology employed in testing the various hypotheses.
The Study Group
The study group is selected from firms listed on the Compact Disclosure 
database35 during the 1989-1996 period.36 The Compact Disclosure monthly database 
included all securities registered with the SEC and traded in American stock markets, 
such as the NYSE, the AMEX, NASDAQ, and other regional stock markets. The 
database included financial statement information, ownership characteristics, trading 
histories, monthly average stock prices, and current dividend information for 
approximately 9,000 publicly traded firms.37 Only those firms traded in the NASDAQ 
national market system have sufficient information about the number of stocks owned by 
institutional investors to warrant inclusion in the study group. Stocks traded on the other 
regional markets in the non-national market system generally do not have sufficient data 
fora meaningful analysis.
35The Compact Disclosure database contains corporate information on public companies filing 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
36 However, the sample excluded January 1989 and February 1990. Therefore, the study used 94 
sets of monthly returns.
17 The number of firms varied each year due to new listings and delistings of firms. The available 
numbers of firms ranged from 4,000 to 6000 every year 1989 through 1996.
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Methodology
This section describes statistical methodologies designed to test the research 
hypotheses, assumptions, and verifications required for each model. The main model for 
testing the research hypotheses, Jobson and Koride's statistics, is used for significance 
tests of portfolio performance based on the traditional Sharpe measure. The traditional 
CAPM and the market model had suffered problems because beta measurement required 
an ex ante expected return generating model. Usually the estimate is prepared with data 
from prior to the test period (Jobson and Korkie, 1981).
Sharpe's measure (1966) represented the excess return per unit o f risk, usually 
represented by the standard deviation, for the market in a well-diversified portfolio.
Sharpe stated his original measure as
S H = ^  (5-1)
where
Pi represented risk premium, actual portfolio fs average holding period return 
minus average risk-free rate over the same period.
O; represented the standard deviation of portfolio i.
This Sharpe measure yields an excess return per unit of risk, but it is not used for 
However, the study employed the Jobson and Korkie Z-statistic score facilitated testing 
portfolio performance utilizing the Sharpe measure. This Z-statistic made it possible to 
test statistical significance for excess returns comparing one portfolio's performance to 
another. This method avoided the beta measurement problem.
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If risk premiums38 followed a multivariate normal distribution,39 they would 
produce the following transformed difference for the Sharpe measure.40
(5-2)
where
SHm = transformed Sharpe performance measured difference between 
portfolios i and m for overall period t, where i represented a 
sample portfolio and m denoted the market proxy portfolio;
r i t '  r «t = Port^°^° (f or m) average means return premiums for overall 
period t\
a ^  = standard deviation of portfolio i return premiums for overall period t;
and
M Risk premium represented actual return minus risk free rate.
39 A  violation of this assumption may lead to some differences between the actual distribution and 
the sampling distribution of test statistics. This in turn causes misspecifrcation that may result in biased 
statistical tests and misleading inferences. Skewness, Kurtosis and Shapiro’s Wilk (W statistic) tests of 
normality reinforce the notion that return premiums are distributed in a fashion close to multivariate normal 
(Elfakhani, 93).
40 Jobson and Korkie's transformed difference for the Sharpe measure is made possible by 
generating asymptotic approximations to the distributions and the moments of die performance estimators. 
They applied Taylor series expansion to get the asymptotic approximations for the expectation and variance 
of an estimator. Taylor series approximations, to the first order term (0(1 IT)), of the expectations of the 
transformed differences gjp E(SHm)*(omv.-apj*(\ Thus, the bias to foe first order of die transformed 
Sharpe difference is However, this bias becomes small if the sample is large. If T is greater than 
36, foe bias becomes almost zero (Jobson and Korkie, 1981).
The asymptotic distributions of die Sharpe performance measures are obtained by observing that 
they are estimators which are functions of the element of r  and S, where returns are assumed multivariate 
normal. Under these conditions foe asymptotic distributions may be derived as
"7i*2o?
where foe variances are equivalent to foe 0(1/7) Taylor series approximations, to the true variances of the 
sampling distributions. For greater detail see Jobson and Korkie (1981).
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a — standard deviations of portfolio m return premiums for overall periodAC t.
A statistical significance test could have resulted from calculating the following 
Z-score:
ZSHm~  (5-3)
V
where
0 represented variance of Sharpe measure, with the variance calculated as 
follows:
T
where
represented covariance between mean return premiums of portfolios i and 
m for the study period.
T represented number of observations.
For any pair of portfolios, the appropriate test required determining whether the 
difference in the transformed Sharpe measures, SHla  ^c equaled zero. Jobson and 
Korkie's transformed difference for the Sharpe measure served to compare a portfolio's 
performance in some time period relative to another period or to compare different 
portfolios in the same period. Jobson and Korkie's Z-score made it possible to compare 
portfolios and determine whether one differed from the other. A Z-score of less than a 
table value (for example, 1.96 for .025 significance level for two-tailed test) precluded
2ofo2 -2o o o +—pfo2 +—u2 o2 -  (a2 +a2a2
i m i m im 2 2 2 0  O '  1 m
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rejection of the null hypothesis. Elfakhani (1993) employed this methodology to test 
Canadian stock returns.
Jensen's alpha measure (1968, 1969) served as a second method in this study. 
This model used pooled time series and cross sectional data. Equation 2-5 tested for a 
positive alpha, resulting from an institution’s superior selection ability. Jensen's alpha 
measure performed two functions: confirming the result of Jobson and Korkie's Z-score 
and determining the magnitude of Jensen's Alpha as a superior stock selector for 
professional portfolio managers.
V V V P / (Jf« ' V +iv  (5 -4)
where Rm represents equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets. 
The other variables are defined in Chapter 2.
Finally, the multiple regression tested the joint effect of the five factors (firm size, 
beta, volatility, R&D, and level of institutional ownership) on portfolio returns of 
institutional investors. The results yielded a prediction model for stock anomalies in the 
context of institutional stock ownership.
A»Mmpti9P»
1. Transaction costs: this study evaluated portfolio performance using the monthly 
percentage total portfolio return on a gross return basis; it measured returns before 
any deductions for transaction costs, fees, taxes, or operating expenses. This does not 
mean that all institutional trades in the securities market had no transaction costs. 
Institutional investors had different transaction costs or fees. This test utilized 
portfolios formed by several criteria and ignored transaction costs and other fees to
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assure comparability among institutions. The reader can use the findings to estimate 
the effects o f varying levels of cost on the reported results.
2. Monthly gross return: this test used monthly stock returns as in the following return 
equation:
where
ru = (Pu + dJ/Pu-i (5-5)
ru -  mean return of security i during time t,
p/ f = average monthly stock price of security i during time t,
Pu-i ~ average monthly stock price of security / during time
period t-1, and
&i t = dividend for security i paid during time period t.Al
All these monthly gross returns data came from the Compact Disclosure monthly 
database.
3. Ownership, asset, and R&D expenditures data: All data for ownership, assets, and 
R&D expenditures came from the October Compact Disclosure database in each year 
1989-1996.
4. The risk-free rate surrogate is the one-month returns: U.S. Government Treasury 
Bills with approximately 30 days left to maturity came from The Wall Street Journal. 
This one-month risk-free rate proxy applied to both sample portfolio returns and 
market index returns.
5. Equally weighted average rate of return: Equally weighted index for each calendar 
year of all New York and, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks are used 
to proxy market index returns.
41 However, this study excluded the dividend portion. The stock with sticker TDK in Compact 
Disclosure had dividend payments of $21 for January through May, 1991 and $25 for June through 
December for the same ye*-. Although this firm paid only twice for the year, the Compact Disclosure 
database contained die previous dividend payment information for every month under the current dividend 
section; Compact Disclosure carried the most recent dividend payment information all the way until a new 
dividend payment occurred. This information, if included, would have created false information on gross 
stock returns.
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6. The study did not use the month’s data for stocks with a price of less than $5 at any 
month end, in order to avoid returns with little economic significance. This applied 
to both the sample portfolio and the market index portfolio.42
7. The study did not use data for stocks with a monthly return greater than 100%. While 
some stocks may legitimately rise spectacularly within one month, these outliers 
might cloud the significance of the great majority of institutional investing. This 
exclusion of stocks rising 100% or more in a month applied to both the sample 
portfolio and the market index portfolio.
8. Construction of market index portfolio (control groups). The control groups are 
utilized only for Jobson and Korkie's test. The control groups use the following 
three criteria.
Ownership portfolio. The control group for the ownership portfolio is a market 
index portfolio consisting of all common stocks traded on the New York Exchange, 
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. This control group is used because the 
subject of interest is how institutional investors perform compared to the market.
Beta, volatility, small firm portfolios. The same classification rules for these 
variables are applied for forming both the control groups and the sample groups. The 
classification criteria are explained in detail under each section of those variables.
R&D portfolio. The R&D sample portfolio is formed using a two-step procedure as 
mentioned in Chapter 2. First, all sample firms are divided into three groups based 
upon the percentage of institutional ownership. Then, each of those three groups is 
subdivided into three groups based upon the amount of R&D expenditures. On the 
other hand, the control group for the R&D portfolio consists of the universe of stocks
42 This procedure eliminated annually approximately 1,100 stocks from die total sample, resulting 
in changing the mean share price from SI8.93 per stock to $23,476. Only 380 stocks are removed from 
the NYSE or AMEX with this price restriction; most stocks removed were NASDAQ stocks.
Before Price Restriction After Price Restriction
sample size mean stock 
price
sample size mean stock 
price
NYSE and 
AMEX only
2,180 S24.68 1,800 S29.36 1
| All Markets 4,800 $18.93 3,700 $23.48 |
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divided into low, medium, and high levels of R&D expenditure, without having first 
been divided based on any other criterion.
Hypothesis I; Institutions’ Superior 
Selection AbilltyJwt
Research Hypothesis 1 examined whether institutions possessed a superior stock 
selection ability. Professional portfolio managers may have had better information than 
individual investors. They also employed economies of scale with pooled assets. 
Therefore, as the concentration of institutional ownership increased, the portfolio return 
from increased institutional ownership also may have increased. The first hypothesis 
anticipated greater portfolio returns from higher levels of institutional ownership than for 
the market or lower levels of institutional ownership.
The statistical model for Hypothesis 1 examined data through Jobson and Korkie's 
transformed Sharpe measure and Jensen's alpha measure. First, the Sharpe measure is 
calculated. Second, the transformed differences for the Sharpe measure are calculated 
and tested for statistical significance by measuring Z-scores. The risk premiums for 
sample returns is regressed on the market risk premium multiplied by the portfolio beta 
to find any positive alphas. A significant positive value from the regression would have 
indicated that institutional portfolio managers possessed a superior selection ability.
This procedure required a division of institutional ownership into five categories. 
The application of quinine percentages resulted in the formation of five stock portfolios 
based upon what percentage of the company all institutions collectively own, is as 
follows:
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• 1st ownership portfolio: less than 20% of each company is owned by all 
institutions taken collectively.
• 2nd ownership portfolio: more than 20% but less than 40% of each company is 
owned by all institutions taken collectively.
• 3rd ownership portfolio: more than 40% but less than 60% of each company is 
owned by all institutions taken collectively.
• 4th ownership portfolio: more than 60% but less than 80% of each company is 
owned by all institutions taken collectively.
• 5th ownership portfolio: more than 80% of each company is owned by 
institutions.
Models 5-1 and 5-3, respectively, measured Sharpe and Jobson and Korkie's Z-score.
Next, portfolios with different institutional ownership are compared to the market 
index portfolio in terms of portfolio return through Sharpe and transformed Sharpe 
measures. Jensen's alpha is used measure to confirm the results. Consistency between 
the data and the CAPM indicated that the researcher could not distinguish subsequent 
time series from zero (equation 5-4). The mean risk-adjusted excess returns for all 
portfolios should have equaled zero under the null hypothesis. On the other hand, a non­
zero value of alpha would have attributed market anomalies to some variables. With 
portfolios grouped on the basis of ownership percentage, any systematic departures from 
zero would indicate an ownership-level effect.
Portfolio betas(Pp), which represent systematic risk of the portfolio, are simply an 
average of the individual security betas, weighted by the proportion of each security in 
the portfolio as in following equation:
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3 = £ * 3  C5-6)
p  i = i  3 3
where z, = the proportion of portfolio market value represented by security j,
N = the number of securities, and
Pj = beta of security j.
The time series OLS regression is constructed with one-month T-Bill rates; monthly 
portfolio returns are calculated by equation 5-5; and portfolio betas are estimated by 
equation 5-6. Equation 5-4 measured Jensen's alpha.
Hypothesis 2: Beta Attribute Test
Tests of Hypothesis 1 determine if different levels of institutional ownership 
consistently experienced any significantly superior performance in picking undervalued 
stocks. Hypotheses 2 through 5 determine superior performance attributes of 
institutional investors who consistently performed in a significantly superior manner 
Assuming rejection of null Hypothesis 1, tests of Hypothesis 2 determine whether 
institutional investors exploited higher-beta stocks. McDonald (1974) found that high- 
beta funds generally outperformed low-beta funds with reference to market-based 
portfolios of equal systematic risk. Hypothesis 2 compares the significance of mean 
monthly excess returns for higher-beta portfolios with that of the market portfolio. 
Estimates of systematic risk, pi( are developed for each of about 8,000 firms operating 
over the entire 1989-1996 period. It did so by regressing stocks' monthly returns 
against market monthly returns:
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where cq and Pi represent regression intercept and slope statistics, respectively; 
and Ti t represents the regression model’s unexplained residual return in period 
t.
The study group for Hypothesis 2 included only stocks owned partly or 
exclusively by institutional investors. The model utilized the following beta categories 
for forming test portfolios. This division has been made to equally divide the sample: 
1st beta portfolio; less than .50,
2nd beta portfolio; > .50 and £ 1.0,
3rd beta portfolio; > 1.0 and £ 1.5,
4th beta portfolio; > 1.5 and £ 2.0, and 
5th beta portfolio; greater than 2.0.
Each of those portfolios is compared with different values of beta to market index 
portfolio in terms of portfolio return through Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe 
measures.
Jensen's alpha measure serves to confirm the results of the Sharpe measures. 
A 5% significance level (one tail test) for the comparison between any of the sample 
portfolios and the market index portfolio would reject the null hypothesis. This would 
suggest that high-beta funds outperformed low-beta funds for market based-portfolios 
of equal systematic risk. Jensen's alpha distance, also, significantly differs from zero.
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Hypothesis 3: Volatility Attribute Test
Hypothesis 3 (assumed rejection of null Hypothesis 1) examines whether 
institutional investors exploited the stock volatility. The variance measured total risk 
over the 96 months for an individual security or portfolio.
Badrinath et al. (1989) found institutional ownership inversely related to stock 
volatility. CAPM also suggested that the market did not compensate for unsystematic 
risk. It inferred that institutional investors required relatively higher returns for holding 
high risk stocks. Hypothesis 3 sought to determine how much higher compensation 
institutional investors required for holding higher volatility stocks in their portfolio.
The study group for Hypothesis 3 included only stocks owned partly or 
exclusively by institutional investors; it established the following standard deviation 
categories for forming test portfolios. The classification has been made to equally 
divide the sample size:
1st volatility portfolio; less than .10,
2nd volatility portfolio; > .10 and £ .13,
3rd volatility portfolio; > .13 and £ .16,
4th volatility portfolio; > .16 and £ .20, and 
3th volatility portfolio; greater than .20.
Each portfolio with different volatility values is compared to the market index 
portfolio in terms of returns through Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe measures. 
Jensen's alpha measure confirms the result of Jobson and Korkie's statistic. Jensen's 
alpha indicated whether monthly excess returns increased or decreased as volatility
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changed. Any statistically significant relationship between monthly excess returns and 
levels o f volatility would have indicated volatility exploitation by institutions.
Hypothesis 4; Small Finn Effect Test
Tests of Hypothesis 4 investigated whether institutional investors made use of 
the well-known small firm effect in their investment portfolios. Assuming the rejection 
of null Hypothesis 1, institutional investors' superior selection power might result from 
purchasing small stocks. Previous research has indicated that small stocks usually 
provided higher returns. Badrinath et al. (1989) found that institutional investors prefer 
larger, more liquid firms; however, they did not study whether those larger firms 
actually generated greater returns in the context of institutional ownership. Small firms 
have had more difficulties than larger firms in generating needed funds. Therefore, 
they have needed to pay higher incentives for potential fund providers. Hypothesis 4 
addressed these theories. It anticipated that as the size of assets increases, the risk- 
adjusted excess returns measured by monthly stock returns would decrease.
Many previous studies found that the month of January has a unusual price 
behavior (Ritter, 1988). It is of interest to investigate January separately from other 
months. To address this issue for this study, it expands the equation (2-5 or 5-4) 
described in Chapter 2, by introducing dummy variables for January and non-January 
months. Following is the basic model:
i
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where Model 5-8 is just a modification of Equation (2-5) with a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one in the month of January and zero otherwise. The other variables 
are defined as in Equation (2-5).
In testing for the small firm effect, stocks owned partly or exclusively by 
institutional investors are divided into the following five categories:
1st asset portfolio; less than $40,000,
2nd asset portfolio; > $40,000 and £ $120,000,
3rd asset portfolio; > $120,000 and £ $340,000,
4th asset portfolio; > $ 340,000 and £ $1,460,000, and 
5th asset portfolio; greater than $1,460,000.43
The division gave an approximately equal sample to each category. Five 
portfolios formed the basis for testing small firms' high return attribute in institutional 
portfolio performance. Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe measures are used to compare 
different portfolio returns to the market index portfolio. Then they applied Jensen's alpha 
measure to confirm the result of Jobson and Korkie's statistic. Jensen's alpha made it 
possible to test whether monthly excess returns increased or decreased as asset amounts 
changed. A negative association between asset amounts and excess returns would have 
shown that institutional investors preferred small firms.
43 Thousand dollars omitted.
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Hypothesis S; RAD Expenditures and
Institution!! Ownership Rtlitigmhip
Test
Tests of Hypothesis 5 examine how institutional ownership relates to R&D 
expenditures and how higher R&D expenditures relate to monthly stock portfolios 
returns. These tests could have produced a negative, positive, or no correlation at all 
between R&D expenditures and the levels of institutional ownership.
The following regression model tested the first relationship:
R&Dlt = a, + b, (Ownit) + eit (5-9)
where R&D, the dependent variable, represented the natural log of total R&D 
expenditures for firm i during time /; Own, the independent variable, represented the 
actual percentage of institutional ownership for firm i during time t; and eit represented 
error term. Equation 5-9 used ANOVA to estimate the relationship between a dependent 
measure of R&D expenditure and an independent measure of institutional ownership 
percentage. Badrinath et al. (1989) found that larger firms, on average, had higher levels 
of institutional ownership. Larger firms, on average, also have higher levels of R&D 
expenditures. These facts led to an expectation of a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and R&D expenditures. However, this would not necessarily 
indicate a positive relationship between portfolio excess returns and higher R&D for firms 
with higher institutional ownership.
In testing the second part o f Hypothesis 5, firms are ranked by percentage of 
institutional holdings as of October of each year and placed in one of three groups. Group 
1 contained stocks with the smallest percentage of ownership by institutions, while groups
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2 and 3 contained an approximately equal number o f firms with equally increasing 
percentages of institutional ownership.
First, the study groups for R&D expenditures are divided according to the 
following ownership criteria:
1st ownership group; less than 30%,
2nd ownership group; > 30 % and £ 60%, and 
3rd ownership group; greater than 60%.
Second, each ownership group is rearranged from high to low R&D expenditures 
to form another three equal-sized data sets. Then, it divided each subset portfolio into 
three portfolios by amounts of R&D expenditures, using the following criteria:
1st R&D category; less than $10,000,
2nd R&D category; > $10,000 and *$100,000, 
and 3rd R&D category; greater than $100,000.44
This resulted in 9 portfolio groups. Each of those portfolios (with different level 
of ownership and different amount of R&D expenditures) are compared to the market 
index portfolio in terms of portfolio return through Sharpe and the transformed Sharpe 
measures. Jensen's alpha measure is used to confirm the result of Jobson and Korkie's 
statistic. Jensen's alpha made it possible to see how monthly excess returns related to the 
various institutional ownership and R&D expenditure levels. It was anticipated that 
results might have explained the interests or orientations of institutional investors. Did
44 All units are thousand dollars omitted.
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they act as myopic investors, or as hyperopic investors? Did they act in a manner 
hyperopic because higher R&D spends generated greater excess returns, or because higher 
R&D expenditures had income production potential?
Institutional Portfolio Performance 
Joint Effect Tests
Finally, the sign of the relationship between institutional portfolio performance 
and five explanatory variables (institutional ownership, beta, volatility, firm size and 
R&D expenditures) is estimated. This is in order to determine whether an institution’s 
portfolio choices based on one or more of those five variables might affect its future 
performance. The following multiple regression equation analyzed the cross-sectional 
predictability of institutional portfolios:
Rj  = b 0 +  biOW Nj +  bjBETAj +  bjVOLf +  b 4FSj -I- bsRADj +  (5-10)
where
Rj = Mean return of stock j in the institutional portfolio for the entire study
period. In this case, R/ is just gross stock return, but not a excess return.
b„ = Intercept term.
b, through b5 = Parameters for OWN, BETA, VOL, FS, and R&D, respectively.
OWNj -  Mean percentage of institutional ownership for stock j  for the entire 
study period.
BETA,- = Beta of stock j  in the institutional portfolio for the entire study period.
VOL,- = Return volatility of stock j  in the institutional portfolio for the entire
study period.
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FSi = Mean value of assets of company j  in the institutional portfolio for the 
entire study period.
R&Dj = Mean value of coincident (not lagged) R&D expenditures of company 
j in the institutional portfolio for die entire study period.
e,- = Error term for stock j  during the entire study period, distributed as N(0,
o2).
* FS and R&D are represented by natural log.
An observation consisted of a stock that had all information for the dependent and 
five independent variables. Institutional ownership, firm size, and R&D expenditures for 
each firm are annual, changing during each of the eight years of the study period. Annual 
data for firm assets and total R&D expenditures changed each year during the eight years 
of the study period, but did not change monthly within each year. Firm assets tend to 
change only slowly, and R&D expenditures may bear a lagged relationship to sales. Beta 
was based on monthly return data, computed by applying the market model to the entire 
study period (not to a preceding estimation period). Stock-price variability was based on 
the entire set of observations used in computing beta.
This procedure resulted in approximately 8,000 observations for each of the 
variables except R&D expenditures. Because not all firms reported R&D expenditures, 
the actual sample size was reduced to approximately 2,300 observations.
This procedure automatically removed firms without institutional investors, so the 
sample, taken as a whole, may be said to represent a collective institutional portfolio.
In a multiple regression model, when two or more independent variables are 
highly correlated with each other, the model is said to have a problem with
i
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multicollinearity. Volatility and beta are expected to be correlated with each other in this 
empirical test. The amount of R&D expenditures and the total assets are also expected 
to be positively related to each other. Therefore, these two pairs are expected to exhibit 
multicollinearity. The existence of multicollinearity tends to inflate the variances of 
predicted values, that is, predictions of the response variables for sets of x values, 
especially when these values are not in the sample. Moreover, muticollinearity tends to 
inflate the variances of the parameter estimates.
To detect the multicollinearity, a correlation matrix45, the VTF statistics (variance 
inflation factors), and condition number (or index) were applied in this test. The variance 
inflation factors are useful in determining which variables may be involved in the 
multicollinearities. There are no formal rules for deciding the magnitude of variance 
inflation factors that cause poorly estimated coefficients. According to the SAS System 
fo r Regression (1996), values exceeding 10 may indicate multicollinearity, but this is 
arbitrary.
The other method, the condition number, is the square root of the ratio of the 
largest to smallest eigenvalue, which provides a single statistic for indicating the severity 
of multicollinearity. As in the VIF statistics, criteria for a condition number to signify 
serious multicollinearity are arbitrary, with the value 30 often given (SAS System for 
Regression 1996).
45 A high correlation coefficient of 70 or 80 over indicates that there is correlation between the two 
independent variables, causing multicollinearity.
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fCHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 presented a review of literature relevant to this study, and 
Chapter 4 stated the five hypotheses. Chapter 5 described the data and the statistical 
methodology. This chapter presents the empirical test results for all five hypotheses and 
the joint effect of five variables (ownership level, beta, volatility, firm size, and R&D 
expenditures) on portfolio performance.
The first section of this chapter presents and analyzes Hypothesis 1 results; those 
tests determine whether institutional investors possessed a superior selection ability. The 
second section presents and analyzes results for Hypothesis 2 through Hypothesis 5; 
which dealt with attributes o f portfolio performance. The third section presents and 
discusses the multiple regression analysis results for the joint effects of five variables on 
institutional portfolio performance.
Hypothesis 1; Institutions* Superior 
Selection Ability Test
Hypothesis 1 examines whether institutional investors exhibited superior stock 
selection power. Tables 1-1, 2-1A, 2-1B, and 4-1 summarize the results of ownership
86
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I87
analysis. Table 1-1, which reports the results of Model 5-1, indicates that some 
ownership portfolios exhibited greater Sharpe measures than the market portfolio. 
Middle-range ownership portfolios had Sharpe measures below those of the market, 
whereas both lower and higher ownership portfolios exceeded the market average. 
Monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns (actual return minus the risk free rate)44 
gradually increased as the level of ownership increased. At the same time, portfolio risk, 
represented by the standard deviation for ownership portfolio returns, also rose as the 
concentration of ownership increased. There is an association between higher risk 
premium and greater risk-taking. The highest Sharpe measure-80% or more-coincided 
with the highest ownership quinine. The next highest Sharpe measure coincided with the 
lowest quinine.
The Sharpe measure of the ownership portfolio as a whole was not significantly 
different from that of the market index portfolio. This implies that the performance of 
institutional investors, taken as a whole, matched the performance of the overall market. 
Thus, collectively, institutional investors would have earned their management fees, but 
no more, in a market without transaction costs. Given that the market has transaction 
costs, institutional investors collectively failed to match the market. Obviously, 
performance of particular institutional investors differed from that o f the average 
institutional investor.
46 In the context of die CAPM, excess return refers to the actual return of a stock over its expected 
equilibrium return (see the positive intercepts in Models 2-5 or 5-4). In this case the term “excess return” 
represented a mean return in excess of the monthly risk-free rate.
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Table 2-1A reports the results of Jobson and Korkie's test in Model 5-2. Jobson 
and Korkie's transformed difference test for the Sharpe measures provided a statistical 
decision criterion. That criterion applied to performance differences between Sharpe 
measures for ownership portfolios and the Sharpe measure for the market index portfolio. 
Only one ownership portfolio—the fifth quinine, representing between 80% and 99% 
ownership—showed mean risk-adjusted excess returns that differ from the market index 
portfolio, at die 5% level. However, for the first and second ownership portfolios, the 
positive transformed Sharpe measures, shown under column SHim in Table 2-1 A, showed 
no statistical significance. Sharpe measures for the first and second sample portfolios did 
not differ significantly from the market average. According to the Z-score on Table 2-1 A, 
institutional investors with the highest ownership percentages earned a significantly 
positive risk-adjusted excess return. That return exceeds the market portfolio average.
Table 2-1A indicates that risk adjusted return produced negative Jobson and 
Korkie's Z-scores for the third and fourth portfolios; the market portfolio outperformed 
these portfolios. Institutional investors' selection ability did not exist at lower and middle 
ownership levels. Indications of stock selection ability occurred only among higher level 
institutional ownership portfolios.47 However, table 2-1A reports that the overall 
performance of institutional investors does not exceed the market index. Ownership 
portfolio analysis implies that although a significant mean excess return difference 
between ownership and market portfolio is found at one certain level of ownership
47 However, this finding might have differed if the study had employed several different control 
groups to compare sample output, instead of only one.
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portfolio, institutional investors as a whole could not outperform the market index returns. 
The same result has been found in the Jensen's alpha test reported below.
Table 2-1B reports the results of the tests for significant differences between pairs 
of ownership portfolios. Table 2-1B indicates statistically significant performance 
differences at the 0.025 level between the fifth and fourth quintiles and also between the 
fifth and third quintiles. Stocks held in greater percentage of institutional investors’ 
portfolios exhibited higher risk-adjusted rates of return, which confirmed expectations 
of this study.
Table 4-1 summarizes the results of Jensen's alpha measure regressed by Model 
5-4, which led to the same conclusion as the Jobson and Korkie's Z-statistic. Like 
traditional Sharpe measures, Jensen's alpha measures required pre-computed portfolio 
betas and showed positive intercepts for the first, second, and fifth ownership portfolios. 
Those betas resulted from weighting the beta averages of the underlying securities, as in 
Model 5-6.
Table 3-1 indicates that portfolio betas increased as ownership concentration 
increased. The first quinine (below 20%) had a Jensen’s alpha value of .055%, the second 
quinine (between 20% and 40%) had a value of .022%, and the third quinine (between 
40% and 60%) had a value of -.028%. The fourth quinine (between 60% and 80%) had 
a value of -.01%, and the fifth quinine (more than 80%) had a value of .46%. As in 
Jobson and Korkie's analysis, the highest Jensen's alpha measure came from the fifth 
ownership portfolio. However, Jensen's alphas for the remaining ownership portfolios
J
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indicated no mean return differences between the sample ownership portfolio and the 
market average portfolio at the 5% level of significance.48
The highest ownership portfolio (consisting of stocks with greater than 80% 
institutional ownership) provided the highest mean risk-adjusted excess return. The 
lowest ownership level, consisting of companies whose stocks were less than 20% owned 
by institutions, created the next largest excess return. Jensen’s alphas led to the same 
conclusion as the Sharpe measures. The two largest alphas, .46% and .055%, come from 
the fifth and first quintile categories, respectively. The remaining quinine portfolios 
produced insignificant results in this Jensen's alpha test
The overall performance by institutional investors does not exceed the market 
mean index. The intercept term for the overall model in the table 4-1, while nominally 
positive, does not achieve statistical significance. This result is the same as in the Jobson 
and Korkie's test
The results of the tests of Hypothesis 1 suggest that as ownership levels increased, 
risk premium, portfolio betas, and portfolio risk also increased. Mean excess returns of 
the sample and control groups did not differ significantly, except in the last ownership 
portfolio, because of the association between higher returns and higher risks. This implies 
that institutional investors did not always succeed in purchasing stocks that could bring 
higher returns. As the "safety-net" theory would imply, continual scrutiny of institutional 
portfolio managers' performance and investment choices tended to insure intrinsically
4S The T statistic had a value of 2.026, and probability had a value o f .0457 for the highest 
ownership portfolio (between 80% and 99% ownership portfolio).
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sound, well-informed, and prudent investment decisions. Institutional investors 
concentrated their activity on sound and stable stocks rather than on stocks with higher 
rates of return.
The highest ownership portfolio showed the greatest risk-adjusted excess return. 
This ownership category also had the greatest portfolio risk and portfolio beta for its 
actual returns; the reward for the higher risk far exceeded the increasing risk. The results 
of Jobson and Korkie's transformed Sharpe difference and Z-score supported this 
relationship.
These results and analyses supported rejection of null Hypothesis I, leading to the 
interpretation that monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns of stock ownership 
portfolios correlated positively with institutional investors' ownership concentration. At 
the highest level of ownership portfolio, the study found a significant difference between 
sample portfolio excess returns and the market index portfolio return.
However, overall, there is no evidence that institutional investors, on average, 
outperform investors who purchase index funds. This implies that the market is very 
efficient. However, as reported in earlier studies, a small number of portfolios can 
consistently achieve a superior stock selection. There are also significant return 
differences between a low institutional ownership group and a high institutional 
ownership group. This means that, for the sample period, stock portfolios held in greater 
percentage by institutional investors exhibit higher risk-adjusted rates of return. This 
study concludes that not all the institutional markets are perfectly efficient. This study 
found that institutional investors earned consistently higher return than that of the market
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index portfolio when they hold stocks mostly owned by themselves and other institutional 
investors. Perhaps these stocks are obvious “winners” and investors continue to bid up 
prices.
Hypothesis 2: Beta Attribute Test
Tests of Hypothesis 1 found that portfolios held mostly by institutional owners 
exhibited superior returns, inferring superior stock picking ability. Based on those results, 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 addressed the identification of institutional investor attributes 
which led to that superior selection ability. Hypotheses 2, the first step in identifying 
those attributes, examined whether institutional investors benefitted from portfolios of 
different betas. Each sample beta portfolio and each control group beta portfolio were 
compared. Models 5-1, 5-2, and 5-4 tested the beta effect on institutional portfolio 
performance. Tables 1-2,2-2A, 2-2B, and 4-2 summarize the results of the beta analysis. 
Table 1-2 reports results of Sharpe measures.
As reported in Table 1-2, the Sharpe measure for the low-beta portfolio was lower 
in the institutional ownership portfolio than in the control portfolio; equal in the second 
portfolio to that of the control portfolio; and higher in the remaining three portfolios than 
in the control groups. As the value of beta increased, so did the risk premiums and 
portfolio standard deviations. The increasing rate of return in the sample beta portfolio 
return did not outpace the increasing rate of return in the control group as the value of 
beta increased. As Table 1-2 indicates, the highest beta portfolio (stock portfolios 
consisting of betas greater than 2.0) had a slightly higher mean risk-adjusted rate of return
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than that of the counterpart in the control groups. Conversely, the lowest beta portfolio 
had a lower return than that of the counterpart in the control groups.
Table 2-2A reports the result of Jobson and Korkie's test. This table reports 
differences of monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns between sample beta and market 
index portfolios. According to Table 2-2A, only the third level (between 1.0 and 1.5) beta 
portfolio had a performance that differed from the market index portfolio at the .05 level. 
The tests determined whether a portfolio of large beta stocks outperformed a portfolio of 
small beta stocks, and it compared both with market index portfolios.
Table 2-2A indicates that—except for the third level beta portfolio—Jobson and 
Korkie’s Z-test did not support higher Sharpe measures for the higher beta categories. 
As the value of beta increased, the monthly mean risk-adjusted excess return also rose; 
however, those increases did not outpace the risk increase. Tests of Jobson and Korkie's 
statistic implied that compensation for beta risk almost equaled the CAPM market risk 
premium. Performances measured by monthly mean risk-adjusted excess returns at both 
lower and higher levels of beta portfolios did not significantly differ from that of the 
market index portfolio. Only in the middle range beta portfolio did the performance 
surpass the market index performance. Table 2-2B shows no significant differential 
performance between any two portfolios.
Table 4-2 reports Jensen's alpha measures in Model 5-4, which also support the 
Jobson and Korkie's Z-test result. The initial step in calculating Jensen's alpha is the 
calculation of portfolio betas by Model 5-6. Table 3-2 reports that as the value of beta 
increased, portfolio betas also increased. Jensen's alphas, which indicated superior
I
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performance, turned negative at the middle level of beta stock portfolios,49 but positive 
at both higher levels and lower levels of beta stock portfolios. However, there are no 
significant alphas. This implies that institutional investors used a stock portfolio selection 
process which can be reasonably approximated by CAPM, and which approximated the 
market performance before taking costs into account. The relationship between the 
portfolio betas and their respective monthly mean excess return is tested by the market- 
based portfolio50 OLS regression.
MR = .001849 + .005311 beta + ut R2 = .0325'
(.0003) (.0001) n = 8,396
* Numbers in parentheses represent t-value significance level.
where MR represented monthly mean excess return for the market-based portfolio. 
Figure 1 depicts these relationships.
49 However, this is completely opposite to the Jobson and Korkie’s test Maybe this is due to the 
different market index applications between the Jobson and Korkie’s test and Jensen’s test
30 This regression was made by regressing a stock’s excess return on its beta in the market index 
portfolio.
Sl This very small R-square represented a cross-sectional time-pooled regression. The F statistic 
had a value of 83 and probability had a value of .0001.
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Figure 1. SYSTEMATIC RISKS AND EXCESS RETURNS52
52 Dots in the graph represent die combinations of die following beta portfolio excess returns and 
their respective portfolio beta of the beta portfolio.________________________________________
P portfolio 1 P portfolio 2 P portfolio 3 P portfolio 4 P portfolio 5
PER* .0017 .0043 .0066 .0096 .0144
portfolio Ps .34 .75 1.2 1.7 2.8
* PER represents portfolio monthly mean excess returns.
j
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The study found no substantial dispersion of monthly mean excess returns of beta 
portfolios from that of the market-based portfolio.
The attribute test implied that higher betas did not contribute significantly to 
superior institutional investor selection. The Sharpe measures indicated no significant 
transformed difference between sample and control groups. This finding contradicted 
McDonald's (1974) theory. As CAPM would imply, the systematic risk and monthly 
mean risk-adjusted excess return are positively related. Higher and lower betas received 
the compensation stated by CAPM, so other selection criteria, filters, or screens which 
may have been applied by portfolio managers do not appear to have added to institutional 
portfolio returns. Although middle range beta groups showed significance with Jobson 
and Korkie’s test only, they had very small Sharpe and Jensen measures.
All beta attributes tests, including the graph explaining the relationship between 
systematic risk and excess return, resulted in failure to reject null Hypothesis 2. In fact, 
the performance of the medium size (third) beta portfolio outperformed the market index 
portfolio. On the other hand, the overall beta test results coincided with the CAPM 
prediction. Thre is a positive relationship between systematic risk and monthly excess 
return based upon Jensen's measure. However, this hardly suggested that the beta effect 
made a major contribution to the institutional investors' superior stock selection ability. 
It implied only that the higher beta group did not outperform the counterpart of the market 
index in the control groups. Finally, if beta had an effect on institutional portfolio 
performance, that effect might have come from the middle range of beta categories.
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Hypottofr 3;VQlitility Attribute 
Teat
As the second step in identifying elements of institutional investors’ extra 
selection ability, tests of Hypothesis 3 examined whether institutional investors 
considered total variability (represented by standard deviation) of individual stocks. The 
tests compared each of the volatility portfolios to its counterpart in the market index 
portfolios.
Tables 1-3,2-3A, 2-3B, and 4-3 summarize the results of the volatility analysis. 
Table 1-3 reports results of Sharpe measures. As this table indicates, risk premium, 
portfolio standard deviation, and Sharpe measures in the sample groups increased as the 
value of the standard deviation grew larger. At the same time, risk premium, portfolio 
risk, and Sharpe measures in the control groups rose as the level of volatility increased. 
According to this table, all except the first of the volatility categories had higher Sharpe 
measures than those of market index portfolios.
Table 2-3A presents the result of Jobson and Korkie's Z-test. The table data 
indicate that mean excess returns from the volatility portfolios did not differ from those 
of market index portfolio, and that this result holds true. Institutional investors required 
higher compensation for holding riskier securities in their portfolio. However, those 
riskier stocks did not provide institutional portfolio managers with extra returns; they only 
compensated for their risks compared to their counterparts in the market index portfolios.
Table 2-3B reports differential performances between portfolios within the 
volatility groups. According to this table, higher volatility groups produced greater
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performance, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. This contradicted the traditional expectation 
of CAPM that the market would reward only systematic risk. Volatility could not have 
contributed to institutional investors' extra selection ability because their paired 
comparison with those of market proxy returns did not differ.
The Jensen's alpha results measure, shown in Table 4-3, did not confirm the 
results of Jobson and Korkie's test. Rather, they indicated that at lower and middle ranges 
of volatility, portfolios performances did not consistently provide significant differences 
from that of the market index portfolio. Neither the negative Model 5-4 intercept terms 
for the first and second volatility portfolios nor the positive terms for the third portfolio 
in Table 4-3 was significant However, the positive intercepts and their /-values appeared 
significant at the 0.16 significance level for the fourth volatility portfolio and at the .01 
significance level for the fifth volatility portfolio. The different output of Jensen's 
measure related to Jobson and Korkie's Z-score resulted from a different market index 
application.*3 When compared to the market index portfolio, stocks with higher levels of 
volatility apparently helped institutional investors generate extra portfolio returns.
Volatility tests gave mixed results, leading to interpretations. According to the 
Jobson and Korkie's test, volatility did not significantly contribute toward extra portfolio 
returns. However, Jensen's measure gave contradictory results, because institutional
53 This study created five different market indices that had the sample categorization rules as 
applied to the sample categorization. Jensen's measure had just one market index return, which came from 
the characteristic of CAPM. CAPM had a market rate of return as one of its components. However, based 
upon the assumption that the market index had been divided into five categories as in the sample, the actual 
results have ended up with die same as the Jobson and Korkie's results. At all levels, the test of volatility 
did not appear to significantly contribute to institutional investors' portfolio extra return.
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investors with higher levels of portfolio volatility generated extra returns. The different 
results imply that when compared to the market, the volatility portfolio generates excess 
returns, hi the control groups, the volatility portfolio does not generate excess returns.54
Null Hypothesis 3 is rejected, but results are mixed on whether high portfolio 
volatility caused additional portfolio returns. Contrary to the CAPM expectation, the 
market provides investors with higher returns that compensated for higher risk. Investors 
required higher rewards for holding riskier stocks. However, riskier stocks produced 
higher returns than the market portfolios. The portfolio volatility analysis results of 
Hypothesis 3 depended upon the methodology chosen for the test. At lower volatility 
levels, both methodologies indicated there was no contribution of volatility to institutional 
investors’ superior selection ability. Jobson and Korkie’s test implied that higher 
volatility could not contribute to institutional investors’ superior stock selection ability. 
However, the Jensen’s alpha measure result is opposite that of the Josbson and Korkie 
test; volatility is found to contribute to institutional investors’ extra returns.
Hypothesis 4; Firm Size Effect Test
As the third step in searching for components of institutional investors’ extra 
selection ability, Hypothesis 4 tests whether institutional investors sought any small firm 
effect. Tables 1-4,2-4A, 2-4B, and 4-4 summarize the results of this.
54 This means that the return o f the stock market as a whole is less than that of the segmented 
market index (as in the control groups) for Jobson and Korkie’s test.
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First, Table 1-4 reports the results of Sharpe measures in Model 5-1. All Sharpe 
measures in the sample groups outperformed the market index portfolios. The first and 
the second paired groups showed the two biggest Sharpe measure differences. This 
analysis indicates a negative relationship between asset portfolio risk and firm size. 
Monthly mean excess returns are also related negatively to firm size. As in earlier 
studies, firm size (represented by total assets) is related inversely to portfolio returns. 
Over the entire study period, the portfolio with the highest asset value earned the lowest 
Sharpe measure (.0881); the group with the lowest asset value earned the highest, .265.
Of the five variables tested, size revealed the smallest portfolio risk difference 
(1.496%) between firms in the lowest category (3.518%) and firms in the highest category 
(5.014%), while Sharpe measures produced the greatest difference (.1774) between firms 
in the lowest category (.088) and those in the highest (.2654). This implies that 
institutional investors, by having small firm stocks with relatively smaller risk in their 
portfolios, might have increased their portfolio extra returns.
The fifth asset group ($1.46 billion assets and more) showed the lowest Sharpe 
measure, .088. This implied that although larger firms had high trading liquidity, they 
hardly contributed to institutional investors' investment maximization goal.
Table 2-4A reports the results of Jobson and Korkie's Z-test in Models 5-2 and 
5-3. It indicates that the smallest firm group showed a significantly high Jobson and 
Korkie's transformed difference measure of .93, with 2.05 Z-score.55 The Z-statistic
35 The second asset portfolio had the next largest transformed measure of .54, with 1.82 Z-score.
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indicated consistent statistical significance at the .02 level for the transformed Sharpe 
difference in mean risk-adjusted return between the smallest sample asset group and the 
counterpart in the control group. This transformed difference decreased as firm size 
increased (see values under column SHim in Table 2-1 A). Table 2-4B also indicates that 
a group of smaller firms (e.g., portfolio 1) performed better than a group of larger firms 
(e.g., portfolio 2, 3, 4, and 5). This inverse relationship between firm size and return 
confirmed the results of the Sharpe measure.
Table 4-4 reports the Jensen's test which confirmed the results of Jobson and 
Korkie's test The alpha measure for the smallest group (.62%) represented the intercept 
in Model 5-4. This alpha denoted the vertical distance between a portfolio's actual return 
and its "equilibrium" level of expected return suggested by the CAPM. This positive 
distance implied an undervaluation of some of the securities in the small asset portfolio. 
Institutional investors may have increased portfolio extra returns by including as many 
of those stocks as they could in constructing their investment portfolios.
The third and fourth larger asset portfolios did not have alpha measures as high 
as the first or the second portfolios. This implied that larger firms, in general, gave 
nothing but liquidity to institutional investors.
January Test: Table 5-1 reports the results of Model 5-8. The January regression 
intercepts were not statistically significant, nor were they significantly different from the 
index fund. The results indicated no relationship between Jensen's alpha and firm size in 
the small firm-January effect test. These results were not consistent with previous 
hypothesis testing, but caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. This
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study covered only an eight-year period of monthly return data. Previous studies—such 
as Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989)—utilized much longer time periods. Eight 
observations per portfolio might not have produced a sufficient basis for the January spot 
test.56
Hypothesis 4 implied that institutional investors considered small firm effects in 
their portfolio construction. As in earlier studies, firm size related inversely to 
institutional portfolio returns, which gave institutional portfolio managers a chance to 
create extra returns. The results dictated rejection of null Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis S; Test of Relationship 
Between RAD Expenditures and
Iflgtiltttional-Qwiimliip
As the last step of analysis of extra institutional portfolio returns, Hypothesis 5 
measured relationships between levels of institutional ownership and R&D expenditures. 
Those tests used F-statistic and p-values to examine the relationship between R&D 
expenditures and institutional ownership. Tests of Hypothesis S-B then determines 
whether that relationship contributed to institutional investors’ superior stock selection 
ability.
16 Inappropriate data application for this test may have precluded detection of a significant 
January effect hi previous studies, more than half of the excess January returns occurred during the first 
five trading days of that month (Roll, 1983). However, this study used stock price information contained 
in the Compact Disclosure database, which contained monthly average stock prices.
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Tests of Hypothesis 5-A
Table 6 presents F-values, R-squares, significance levels, coefficient estimates, 
and p-values of the Model 5-9 regression. Table 6 gives the value of the F statistic 
(F=3596) and the probability value (.0001). The results indicate a positive relationship 
at the .01 significance level between R&D expenditures and each level of institutional 
ownership.57
The t-statistic (t=60) of the independent variable (institutional ownership 
percentage) also confirmed a linear relationship between the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditures and institutional ownership percentages at the .01 significance level. 
Ownership proved significant with a .042214 coefficient. Firms with higher levels of 
institutional ownership exhibited higher R&D expenditures. The results aligned with 
previous studies such as Kochhar and David (1996) and Hansen and Hill (1991).
With respect to R&D expenditures, institutional investors behaved in a hyperopic 
manner. These findings dictated rejection of null Hypothesis 5-A.
Test of Hypothesis 5-B
Hypothesis 5-A proved a significant positive relationship between institutional 
stock ownership levels and R&D expenditures. Hypothesis 5-B examined whether that 
relationship contributed to institutional investors' superior stock selection ability. Tables
57 When added with firms' total assets to Model 5-9, R-square increased to 63% from 27%, while 
the overall significance level remained as low as the .0001 in the original model. Morever, more 
importantly, contrary to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), institutional ownership is positively related to firm size 
measured by total assets. The t-statistic of the asset variable is significant at the .0001 level. This finding 
is consistent with the Badrinath et al. argument For more details, see Table 6-2.
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1-5, 2-5A, 2-5B and 4-5 summarize R&D expenditure contributions to institutional 
portfolio performances.
Table 1-5 presents results of Sharpe measures through Model 5-1. As the size of 
R&D expenditures increased, Sharpe measures at all ownership levels decreased, in 
contrast to expectations. Regardless of the level of institutional ownership, smaller R&D 
portfolios outperformed larger R&D portfolios. The R&D portfolios with higher 
institutional ownership outperformed the same levels of R&D portfolios with lower 
institutional ownership. The LM portfolio (L for low institutional ownership, M for 
medium R&D expenditures) foiled to equal the market portfolio’s performance; all other 
R&D portfolios performed better than the control groups.
Table 2-5 reports the results of Jobson and Korkie's transformed differences and 
Z-scores for R&D portfolios in Model 5-2 and 5-3. The table indicates that none of the 
nine R&D portfolios showed any different performance at the 5% significance level, 
compared to the matched sample of similar market index portfolios. However, R&D 
portfolios in the highest ownership group dominated other R&D portfolio groups in the 
different ownership groups. The lowest R&D portfolio with the highest ownership group 
showed the biggest transformed Sharpe measure (1.36). However, higher significance test 
results did not support that high transformed difference because of the increased level of 
portfolio risk. In general, the contribution of the R&D factor to institutional portfolio 
performance related inversely to amounts of R&D spending and positively to levels of 
institutional ownership. The results of Jobson and Korkie's test supported the results of 
the traditional Sharpe measure.
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Table 4-5 represents the results of Jensen’s alpha measures in Model 5-4. All the 
intercepts for the largest R&D expenditures in the Jensen's alpha test proved negative, but 
are not significant Among them the largest R&D portfolio with the highest institutional 
ownership portfolio produced the greatest intercepts. Within the same institutional 
ownership group, R&D expenditures related inversely to the Jensen's alpha measure. This 
meant that higher level of R&D expenditures did not contribute to institutional investors' 
selection ability. This precluded rejection of null Hypothesis 5-B.
Institutional investors exhibited great concern with research and development 
costs; however, those expenditures did not have a positive correlation with portfolio 
performance.58 In theory, bigger firms had higher levels of institutional ownership59 
(Mason, 1995) and a strong positive correlation with R&D expenditures.60 This study 
found an inverse correlation between firm size and stock returns; however, higher levels 
of ownership positively related to stock returns.
These results could lead to several conclusions. First, excess returns from higher 
institutional ownership did not overcome the inferior returns from larger firms. Second,
51 The impact of R&D on firms’ profit usually occurs with a lag, not coincidentally. This study 
tested die relationship between the amount of R&D expenditure and its effect on the firms’ profit, assuming 
coincidence. An assumption of coincidence implies that investors and firm managers can all arrive at an 
expected present value of the results of R&D. If this is not the case, a new model might be needed to lag 
the effects of R&D, thereby alleviating the problem of when to expect to receive benefits from the 
expenditure.
39 However, this is contrary to Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) argument
60 Regression tests between firm size and R&D expenditures created an R2 of 66%, with a .0001 
significance level. For more details, see Appendix Table 6-3.
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institutional investors prefer firms with relatively higher R&D expenditure, despite the 
possible diminution of current return, because of the potential long-run benefits.
Institutional Portfolio Performance 
Joint Effect Test
Finally, this study develops a forecasting model for institutional portfolio 
performance, based on all variables employed in this test. Table 7 reports the results of 
model 5-10. Limited multicollinearity problems occurred with all the independent 
variables.61 For example, output Table 7-1 lists a rather low (.06) regression R2. Since 
l/O-R^l.Oti,® variables associated with VTF values exceeding 1.06 related more closely 
to the other independent variables than to the dependent variable.
The Condition Number is used for detecting multicollinearity is the square roots 
of the ratios of the largest eigenvalue to each of the other eigenvalues. The number of 
large values in this column also indicates near linear variable dependencies. 
Multicollinearity problems may exist when eigenvalues have condition numbers greater 
than 30.63 In output Table 7-2, all eigenvalues had condition numbers less than 3.5.
61 Statistical literature and prior research have established no formal criteria for determining the 
magnitude of variance inflation factors that cause poorly estimated coefficients. Usually, values exceeding 
10 have caused concern, but page 97 of the 1996 SAS Regression Manual treats this value as arbitrary. 
However, “for models with low coefficients of determination for the regression, estimates of coefficients
that exhibit relatively small variance inflation factors may still be unstable---- ” (SAS Regression Manual
1996,97).
62 The variance inflation factor equaled l^l-Rj2), where Rj2 represented the coefficient of 
determination for the “regression” of the ith independent variable on all other independent variables.
63 This is also arbitrary, not a formal criterion.
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The correlation matrix in Table 7-1 also indicates some multicollinearities 
between R&D and assets between volatility and beta, and between R&D and institutional 
ownership. However, removing one of those variables which caused multicollinearity 
problems at a time, produced no significant changes in the variances or values of the 
parameter estimates. The interpretation of regression output in model 5-10 assumes 
some multicollinearity.
Model 5-10 was significant at 0.01, with small (5.9%) variability. The F value 
was 28.7. See Table 7-2.
R, = -.03637 + .0002 Own + .002 BETA + .0675 VOL + .004 FS - .0025 R&D 
(.0001) (.0001) (.0006) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
* The numbers in parentheses represent the significance level of t-statistics.
In Table 7-2, all explanatory variables are significantly related to institutional 
portfolio performance. Beta is significant at the .0006 level. The signs of coefficients for 
each of the variables are positive, except for that of R&D.
All the signs except that for the asset variable are as hypothesized. The asset 
variable related negatively to the portfolio return in the attribute test. Holding constant 
all other variables, the model indicates an increase of .0002 in monthly mean portfolio 
return with each percentage increase in institutional ownership; and the model predicts 
an increase of .004*(l/$33,000,000) in monthly mean portfolio return for each unit of
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increase in assets.64 This finding disagreed with results of the small firm attribute test. 
Holding constant everything else, with one unit increase in R&D expenditures, the model 
predicts a decrease of .00253*(1/$132,000) in monthly mean portfolio return.65
The final chapter presents the overall conclusions from testing and analysis. More 
detailed implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research are presented.
64 In a semi-linear-log form of regression, the slope of this form depends upon the value of 
independent value of asset, the value of dependent value of portfolio return, or both. As a non-constant, 
it depends upon where along the function the expression is evaluated. In this case, the portfolio has a mean 
average asset value of $33,000,000. If this mean value of assets were to change, then the slope of this 
expression might change, too. Therefore, this slope has validity only with a mean value asset of 
$33,000,000.
<5 Mean value of R&D expenditures. The same theory applies to the R&D variable as asset
variable.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fCHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the recent dramatic increases of institutional holdings of 
corporate stock. It also measures the success of portfolio managers’ returns on 
investment. Did these managers possess a superior stock selection ability? If they did, 
where did the stock selection power come from? Did it come from beta, stock volatility, 
small firm effect, R&D expenditures, or some combination of these? If they possessed 
a real superior stock selection ability, could a description of that ability form a prediction 
model for future investors?
This study utilized data for stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. 
It tested five potential explanatory hypotheses using Sharpe’s measure, Jobson and 
Korkie's Z-test, and Jensen's alpha measure. For Sharpe’s and Jobson and Korkie's tests, 
several different market index portfolios were constructed by the same classification rules 
as those applied to sample groups. For Jensen's model, a modified CAPM model was 
employed.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
f110
Institutional Ownership
Analysis of ownership portfolios indicated that institutional investors are 
somewhat successful in choosing undervalued stocks. Institutional investors as a whole 
do not show superior selection ability performance when compared to a market index 
portfolio. However, when the ownership portfolios are divided into groups based on 
different levels of ownership concentration, some of these exhibited a significant 
difference in mean excess returns, relative to the market. Stocks with more than 80% or 
less than 40% institutional ownership produced the highest extra returns. The selection 
power of institutional investors proved very weak at the middle range of institutional 
ownership. This implied behavior is consistent with the safety net theory. Portfolio 
managers selected solid, safe, and prudent stocks, with secondary emphasis on returns.
Gross returns analysis excluded transaction costs. Had these costs been included, 
the mean return differences between the ownership and market index groups might have 
equaled, or even fallen below, that of the stock market as a whole.
The monthly mean return for companies owned by institutions did not 
significantly exceed returns for the market except for the portfolio in which stocks 
represented companies at least 80% owned by institutions. Although stock portfolios 
owned significantly by institutions showed a relatively high portfolio risk, the return 
outpaced the risk-to-retum ratio. Risk-adjusted rates of return of highly condensed 
ownership portfolios outperformed lower ownership concentration portfolios.
Although the institutional ownership sample as a whole showed neither 
significantly superior nor inferior performance, individual portfolios performed in a
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superior maimer. This is consistent with results of mutual fund studies such as McDonald 
(1974), Mains (1977), and Kon and Jen (1979). This finding is consistent to the 
“sophisticated” clientele group (Gruber, 1996) in which money is directed to funds based 
on performance.
Beta Effect
The second hypothesis addressed the beta effect on institutional portfolio 
performance. Portfolio excess returns are examined within several different beta portfolio 
levels. Jensen's alpha measures computed by the modified CAPM (Model 5-4) showed 
that the intercept did not significantly differ from zero and did not support the traditional 
high beta performance theory. Although middle range beta portfolios generally 
outperformed the market, the higher beta effect did not contribute to institutional 
investors’s superior portfolio performance. In this case, sample portfolio compensation 
equaled its systematic risk.
Volatility Effect
Volatility analysis presented mixed results, depending upon the methodology 
applied; and at higher levels of volatility, Jobson and Korkie's test implied that 
institutions generated no abnormal return from stock volatility. To the contrary, Jensen's 
alpha measure indicated that institutions benefitted from stock volatility, which might 
provide useful information for institutions seeking to generate extra portfolio returns. 
Contrary to the traditional view on volatility, the markets compensated for total risk. As
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volatility increased, the rate of return also increased commensurately with the market 
index, as shown in Table 1-3.
Firm Size and January Effect
The small firm effect resulted in the greatest contribution to institutions' superior 
selection power. In general, the smaller firms generated higher monthly mean excess 
risk-adjusted rates of return.
The expected January effect was not funded. However, the data used for testing 
the January effect may not have properly served this purpose. Previous studies showed 
that the January effect occurred in the first few trading days of the year, but this study 
employed monthly return data.
R&D Expenditures
The test of R&D expenditures using simple and multiple regression indicated a 
positive, but weak relationship between R&D expenditures and both institutional holdings 
and institutions’ abnormal returns. In the context of R&D expenditures, institutional 
investors acted hyperopically.
The next test investigated whether the positive relationship between R&D 
expenditures and institutional ownership contributed to portfolio performance. In general, 
the level of R&D expenditures and monthly mean excess risk-adjusted rate of returns 
were inversely related. R&D expenditures portfolios with higher institutional ownership 
showed greater rates of return. Although the results did not prove significant, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
!113
relationship occurred across institutional ownership levels and with all test 
methodologies.
Institutions were found to prefer firms with larger R&D expenditures, but these 
did not generate extra returns. Institutional managers may have preferred larger R&D 
expenditures because of a high correlation between R&D and innovation.
Joint Effects Test
This study presents a limited decision model based upon several explanatory 
variables. The multiple regression model produced significant results at the .01 level with 
an F statistic of 28.7. The output of Model 5-10 indicates a significant relationship 
between portfolio returns and four variables (volatility, beta, asset, and institutional 
ownership).
Contrary to expectations, the R&D variable related inversely to the portfolio 
return. This supported the results of the of R&D expenditures attribute test. The asset 
variable contributes positively to institutional portfolio returns. This is contrary to the 
results of the total assets attribute test. Each of the parameters was significant, and the 
regression model explained 5.9% of the total variation.
Contributions
This study evaluated the portfolio selectionability performance of institutional 
investors. Most previous work focused on only one segment (mutual funds) which does 
not represent the performance of all institutional investors.
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Additionally, this study determined some characteristics of institutional investors 
by examining relationships between their stock selection ability and their attributes. 
Previously, most academic work on institutional investors focused on identifying superior 
time forecasters and superior stock selectors. The previous literature lacked behavioral 
facts such as the “whys and hows” of superior investment selection. Institutional 
performance is related to firm quality attributes such as beta, volatility, firm size, and 
R&D expenditures.
In conclusion, institutional investors as a whole are not superior stock selectors; 
however, specific portfolios performed in a superior manner. The institutions’ superior 
selection ability is partly based on such firm quality attributes as firm size and returns 
volatility effects.
Limitations
One of the limitations of this study is that it used monthly return data that did not 
completely satisfy the purpose of the research. The test of the January small firm effect 
was likely not significant due to the use of monthly return data.
Directions for Future Research
This study tested the effects of selected variables—beta, stock volatility, firm size 
effect, R&D expenditures—on financial institutions’ stock portfolio returns. Other proven 
anomalies such as cash flow, E/P ratio, past performance, liquidity ratio, book to market 
ratio, working capital, and earnings might also have affect institutional portfolio returns.
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To develop a more accurate relationship between superior institutional 
performance and its attributes, a research study design should include institutional micro 
and macro forecasting such as timing of beta manipulation. Furthermore, a future study, 
based on individual institutional investors rather than upon investors as a whole, would 
give insight for evaluating institutional investment behavior. Future research should 
incorporate both cross-sectional and time-series data.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A P P E N D I X
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
BETA-RETURN RELATIONSHIP
AUTHOR. JOURNAL SAMPLE. PERIOD ISSUES & RESULTS
Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 
1972
Studies on the Theoiy of 
Capital Markets
Monthly returns of NYSE stocks, 
1931-1965
Low-risk stocks had higher returns than the CAPM 
would predict. High-risk stocks had lower returns 
than the model would predict.
Fama and MacBeth, 1973 
|  J of Political Science
NYSE common stocks monthly 
returns, 1935-1968
A positive and linear relationship between return and 
risk, but very weak statistical evidence.
McDonald, 1974 
JFQA
123 American Mutual Funds 
Monthly Returns, 1960-69
High-beta funds "outperformed" low-beta funds and 
the neutral performance of mutual funds.
Fama and French, 1992 
J of Finance
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ return 
files from the CRSP, 1941-90 & 
1963-90
A relation between average stock returns and beta 
during the longer period, but no relation over the 
shorter period.
Chan and Lakonishok, 1993, J 
|  of Portfolio Management
Monthly returns files from CRSP, 
1926-1991
A strong positive relation between beta and risk up to 
1982, but no relation thereafter because of noise in 
the data.
1 Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan, 
I 1995
fl J of Finance
Monthly portfolio returns of NYSE 
and AMEX stocks from CRSP, 1927- 
90,1940 -1990, and 1963-90
No relation between beta and average return over the 
relatively shorter period; however, a positive relation 
between average returns and beta risk over the longer 
period, provided that the study measured betas at the 
annual interval.
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RISK-INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS RELATIONSHIP
SAMPLE. PERIOD
— — — M- -  -  ... U
ISSUES A  RESULTS
Sias, 1996
Financial Analysts Journal
Weekly rate of returns for all 
securities listed on NYSE from 
1977 to 1991
Focused on the relationship between volatility and institutional 
holdings. An increase in institutional holdings increased volatility; 
the increase preceded an increase in volatility because institutional 
investors played a destabilizing role in financial markets. However, 
higher returns resulted in relatively lower volatility.
FIRM SIZE AND BETA-RETURN RELATIONSHIP
| Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986 
J of Banking and Finance
All stocks traded on the NYSE for 
at least 8 years between 1954 and 
1981 and CRSP monthly return 
data from the period 1962 -1981
Studied the historical relationship between stock market returns and 
the following variables: beta, residual standard deviation, and size. 
Neither the traditional measure of beta risk nor the alternative risk 
measures could explain the cross-sectional variation in returns; 
only size appeared to matter.
|  Ritter and Chopra, 1989 
H J of Finance
The CRSP monthly returns file of 
NYSE securities for the 1935- 
1986 period
They found a positive risk-retum relation in January for small firms 
but not for large firms. High-beta small firms had higher excess 
returns than low-beta small firms in January, irrespective of 
whether the market provided a positive or negative return.
0 0
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FIRM SIZE EFFEC
SAMPLE. PERIOD
Banz, 1981
J of Financial Economics
Monthly return data from CRSP files of 
all stocks traded in the NYSE during 
1926 to 1975 period
Small NYSE firms have had significantly larger risk 1 
adjusted returns than large NYSE firms over a forty- I 
year period. He found a non-linear relation; the 1 
smallest earned larger excess returns, whereas the 
medium size portfolios showed little difference from 
that of the largest. The study found a size effect, but 
no clear explanation.
Roll, 1981 
J of Finance
Several different interval returns of 
NYSE and AMEX from 1962 to 1977
An improper estimation of security betas could have 
explained part of the observed risk-adjusted excess 
returns related to size. Previous studies had 
improperly measured the riskiness of small firms.
Reinganum, 1981 
J of Financial Economics
366 NYSE and AMEX stocks from 
1976 to 1977 based on quarterly and 
annual earnings data
Small firms systematically experienced average rates 
of return significantly greater than those of large firms 
with equivalent beta risk. This suggested either a 
misspecified CAPM or inefficient capital markets.
Reinganum, 1983 
J of Financial Economics
Daily return data of CRSP files from all 
securities traded on the NYSE and 
AMEX from 1962 to 1980
To test for size effects. Small firms experienced large 
returns during the first few trading days of January.
Brown, Kleidon, and Marsh, 1983 
J of Financial Economics
-
Quarterly data of 366 firms listed on the 
NYSE (1926 -1978) and AMEX (1963 - 
1978)
The study found a linear size effect. It also found a 
sensitivity to the time period studied and 
methodologies applied.
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FIRM SIZE EFFECT (continued)
^  """ "  ""
Keim, 1983
J of Financial Economics
CRSP daily stock files from 1963 to 
1979 based on stocks listed on the 
NYSE and AMEX
A negative relation between size and average returns. 
Large means for January relative to the remaining 
eleven months.
Reinganum and Smith, 1983 
J of industrial Economics
CRSP daily files during the period from 
1962 to 1978 from all securities traded 
on the NYSE and AMEX
Small firms experienced substantially higher average 
returns than large firms on a risk-adjusted basis.
Barry and Brown, 1984 
J of Financial Economics
Monthly NYSE security returns for the 
period 1926 to 1980.
To find the cause of firm size effect with differential 
information. Factors other than differential 
information influenced the firm size effect.
Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986 
J of Banking and Finance
Monthly return data from the CRSP 
files and covering the period from 1954 
to 1981
Small firms yielded higher returns than did larger 
firms; however, with January data, the size variable 
lost its statistical significance.
Jaffe, Keim and Westerfleld, 1989 
J of Finance
Monthly return data of AMEX and 
NYSE firms from the CRSP files during 
the period, 1951-1986
A significant size effect in January.
Ritter and Chopra, 1989 
J of Finance
The CRSP monthly returns file of NYSE 
securities for the period 1935-1986
About the risk-retum characteristics of small firms in 
January. The study found a positive risk-retum 
relationship in January for small firms but not for 
large firms. High-beta small firms had higher excess 
returns than low-beta small firms in January, 
irrespective of positive or negative market returns.
. . . . . . . .  .. .  ..
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FIRM SIZE EFFECT (continued)
SAMPLE. PERIOD
Amihud and Mendelson, 1989 
J of Finance
CRSP monthly return data of NYSE 
securities for the period 1960-1979
Tested whether asset returns served as an increasing 1 
function of their beta risk, residual risk, and firm size. 1 
Conclusion: a positive beta, but negative residual risk 1 
and firm size relationship with asset returns.
Tsetsekos and DeFusco, 1990 
J of portfolio Management
CRSP data files and Value Line for the 
1979-1984 period
To test whether portfolios of firms with high 
managerial ownership outperformed portfolios of 
firms with low managerial ownership. They found the 
size effect, but it did not depend on the level of 
managerial ownership.
Leong and Zaima, 1991 
J of Business Finance & Accounting
CRSP files for NYSE-AMEX returns 
and National OTC Stock Journal from 
1981 to 1983
Focused on OTC stocks to find the clue for the small 
firm effect because OTC stocks had lower values than 
those of NYSE-AMEX. All together, no small firm 
effect; however, the January excess return for OTC 
stocks exceeded that of the smallest market value 
NYSE-AMEX group.
Elfakhani, 1993
Review of Financial Economics
300 firms of Toronto Stock Exchange 
for the sampling period 1977 to 1988 
based on quarterly and annual data
Small and medium sized firms displayed superior 
performance over large firms during most of the study 
period.
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BETA NON-STATIONARITY
Fabozzi and Francis, 1978, 
JFQA
Monthly Returns of NYSE stocks from 
CRSP files, 1965-71, random coefficient 
model.
True beta moved randomly, while the OLS beta 1 
performed as a point estimate which did not R 
vary over the sample period. Q
Roenfeldt, Griepentrog,and Pflaum, 
1978, JFQA
Monthly 664 firms from the Compustat 
Price-Div.-Eamings Tape, 1963-74
Betas had a definite tendency to remain in the 
same quintile over time.
Kon and Jen, 1979 
J of Business
49 mutual funds, monthly return from 1960 
to 1971
Quandt’s switching regression model applied.
A mixture of two (21funds) or three(6funds) 
regression equations rather than that of the 
standard linear model. It tested for timing 
activities.
Fabozzi and Francis, 1979, J of 
Finance
Monthly rates of return for 85 mutual funds 
from 1965-71 single index market model
No indication of shifting mutual fund 
systematic risk for Bull and Bear markets.
Sunder, 1980 
J of Finance
Monthly rates of return for NYSE stocks 
from 1926-75
The market risk followed a random walk over 
time, and it followed an autoregressive process. 
The average level of nonstationarity varied from 
one subperiod to another (high during 1926-50 
and low during 1963-75).
Merton, 1981 
J of Business
Simulations Superior market-timing ability earned a 
substantial additional average rate of return.
Henriksson and Merton, 1981, J of 
Business
Statistical techniques for testing timing 
forecasting ability through both parametric 
and nonparametric
Tested for timing ability. Nonparametric: 
Forecasting skills differed for up markets and 
for down markets. Parametric: the expected 
"up-market" beta of the portfolio exceeded the 
expected "down-market" beta of the portfolio.
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BETA NON-STATIONARITY (continued)
SAMPLE. PERIOD. A  METHODS ISSUES &  RESULTS I
Ohlson and Rosenberg, 1982, J of 
Business
NYSE common stocks from 1926 -1975, 
equal-weighted market portfolio preferred.
A tendency for betas to converge rather slowly I 
toward a norm (the stationary mean) and a j  
stationary first-order autoregressive process. 1
Lee and Chen, 1982 
J of Economics and Business
Monthly rates of return for 363 NYSE 
companies from 1965 - 1979
65% of the sample firms showed an unstable 
beta over the ten-year period.
Kon, 1983 
J of Business
Monthly rates of return for 37 mutual funds 
from 1960-1976
Individual mutual funds exhibited significant 
positive timing ability; however, portfolio betas 
remained stable over the study period.
Chang and Lewellen, 1984 
J of Business
Monthly rate of returns for 67 mutual funds 
from 1971-1979
No evidence of skillful market timing or clever 
security selection abilities', mutual funds did not 
outperform a passive investment strategy.
Henriksson, 1984 
J of Business
116 open-end mutual funds using the 
parametric and nonparametric techniques 
from 1968 -1980.
Indicated little evidence of ability by portfolio 
managers to successfully engage in either 
market timing or selectivity during this period.
Bos and Newbold, 1984 
J of Business
Monthly return data of464 stocks from 
NYSE, 1970 -1979
Strong evidence for randomness of systematic 
risk in the market model rather than 
autocorrelation.
Simonds, LaMotte, and McWhorter,
Jr., 1986
JFQA
100 firms from NYSE during 1951-1974 Betas for individual NYSE-listed stocks 
apparently nonstationary.
U>
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BETA NON-STATIONARITY (continued)
ISSUES A  RESULTS I
Breen, Jagannathan, and 
Ofer, 1986 
J of Business
Simulation techniques and monthly return 
data on the stocks in the NYSE during the 
period 1968 -1982, VW
The correction for heteroscedasticity 1 
significantly improved the power of testing | 
market timing ability.
Collins, Ledolter, and Rayburn, 1987 
J of Business
Weekly return data for both 500 individual 
securities and 500 portfolios of size 10,50, 
100 from NYSE and AMEX covering 1962- 
81
Proved a stochastic variation in the beta risk of 
equity securities. Weekly data improved the 
power of the test.
Rahman, Kryzanowski, and Sim, 1987 
J of Financial Research
119 utilities firms during the period 1974 
through 1978 and 1979 through 1983, VW
53 and 69 utility firms rejected at the 5% and 
10% level of significance, respectively.
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R&D EXPENDITURE AND INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS
AUTHOR. JOURNAL SAMPLE. PERIOD ISSUES & RESULTS 1
Jarrell and Lehn, 1985 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission
324 companies (19 industries) for the 
period 1980 to 1983.
To look at the relationship between H 
institutional ownership and R&D spending. Q 
Found a positive relationship between the level 
of institutional ownership and the R&D-to- 
sales ratio.
Graves, 1988
Academy of Management J
22 computer-manufacturing companies 
only for the period from 1976 to 1985
A negative relationship between R&D 
spending and institutional ownership; high 
levels of institutional ownership may have 
suppressed R&D spending of the computer 
industry. However, the study measured R&D 
expenditures per employee rather than the 
R&D-to-sales ratio.
Hill and Snell, 1989 
Academy of Management J
Firms in COMPUSTAT tapes for 
1979-81
A positive relationship between major 
stockholders and R&D expenditure per 
employee.
Hansen and Hill, 1991 
Strategic Management J
129 firms based in four research­
intensive industries over the period 
1977- 1986
Examined the relationship between R&D 
spending and institutional ownership. Higher 
levels of institutional ownership may have 
coincided with greater R&D expenditures. It 
defined R&D intensity as the percentage of 
total R&D spending to sales rather than R&D 
per employee.
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R&D EXPENDITURE AND INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS (continued)
AUTHOR. JOURNAL SAMPLE. PERIOD ISSUES & RESULTS
Bathala, Moon, and Rao, 1994 
Financial Management
A sample firms from the NYSE, 
AMEX, OTC in existence at the end of 
1988
A negative relationship among institutional 
ownership, the level of debt financing, and 
managerial equity holdings. An inverse 
relationship between the debt ratio and R&D 
expenses.
Kochhar and David, 1996 
Strategic Management J
135 mainly manufacturing firms traded 
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
for 1989 year end data
Examined the relationship between institutional 
investors and firm innovation. The results 
indicated that institutions did not foster a short­
term orientation; instead, they may have 
influenced firms to increase innovation.
to
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MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
AUTHOR. JOURNAL SAMPLE. PERIOD ISSUES & RESULTS I
Jack Treynor 
1965
Harvard Business Review
Performance of mutual, trust and 
pension funds for the period 1954- 
1963
Developed a method for evaluating fund 1 
performance. The slopes of characteristic lines 1 
allowed for a relative evaluation of fund 1 
managers’ performances. (T-R)lbm 1
Jack Treynor and 
Kay Mazuy 
1966
Harvard Business Review
Performance of 57 open-end mutual 
funds during the period of 1963
Devised a statistical test to estimate fund 8 
managers' timing abilities by introducing a 
curved term, (rm -rr)2 in the characteristic line. 
Found little evidence of timing ability.
William Sharpe 
1966
J of Business
Performance of 34 open-end mutual 
funds, 1954-63
Devised an R/V ratio for portfolio rankings. 
(Reward-to-variability ratio). Explained the 
relationship between risk premium and standard 
deviation. The Dow-Jones R/V had a .667 ratio; 
however, the average fund in this sample had a 
.633 R/V.
Michael Jensen 
1968
J of Finance
The returns on the portfolios of 115 
open-end mutual fUnds for the period 
1955-64
Devised a way of evaluating the performance 
portfolios in terms of funds managers' selection 
abilities. The alpha-hat average, calculated net 
of expenses (-.011), indicated that on average 
the funds earned about 1.1% less per year than 
they should have earned, given their level of 
systematic risk. |
t o
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MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE (continued)
AUTHOR. JOURNAL SAMPLE. PERIOD
------- - -----=*— ■ «■■ ■ —i ■■
ISSUES & RESULTS
John McDonald
1974
JFQA
Return of 123 American mutual funds 
using monthly returns in the period 
1960-1969
In a world of transaction costs and management 
fees, he found a zero alpha, which meant 
neutral performance.
Norman Mains 
1977
J of Business
The same sample as Jensen's 
empirical, which is 1 IS mutual funds 
for the period 19SS-64.
Based on monthly return data, mutual funds 
performed in an approximately neutral manner 
on a net return basis.
Kim, Tye
1978
JFQA
The quarterly investment performance 
of mutual funds in the period 1969- 
1975.
No abnormal performance with the weighted 
index portfolio applied.
Grinblatt and Titman 
1989
J of Business
_____________________
Monthly mutual fund data from Dec. 
1974 to Dec. 1984
Some evidence of superior forecasting ability 
on the part of the fund manager at the 
individual level; however, overall mutual fund 
actual returns, net of expenses, did not exhibit 
abnormal performance.
s>QO
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TIMING AND SELECTION ABILITIES
AUTHOR. JOURNAL SAMPLE. PERIOD ISSUES & RESULTS I
Kon and Jen 
1979
J of Business
49 mutual funds from January 1960 to 
December 1971.
Some superior performance in terms of overall |  
selection ability; however, mutual fund 
managers individually and on average could 
not forecast the future prices well enough to 
recover all fees.
Stanley Kon 
1983
J of Business
Monthly data of 37 mutual funds from 
Jan. 1960 to June 1976
Some success among individual fund 
managers; however, fund managers as a group 
had no special abnormal returns.
Henriksson
1984
J of Business
116 open-end mutual funds monthly 
performance using the parametric and 
nonparametric techniques from 1968 
to 1980.
Both tests showed that mutual fund managers 
could not forecast market movements. Only 
three funds successfully timed the market.
Chang and Lewellen 
1984
J of Business
67 mutual funds form Jan. 1971 to 
Dec. 1979.
Found neither skillful market timing nor clever 
security selection abilities.
Lee and Rahman 
1990
J of Business
Monthly returns for 87 months 
(January 1977 - march 1984) for a 
sample of 93 mutual funds.
Some evidence of superior micro- and macro­
forecasting ability on the part of the fund 
manager at the individual fund level.
MvO
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Table 1-1 Sharpe Measure (SM) for Institutional Ownership Portfolio
(Based on Model 5-1)
ow n.,
<20*
20* < ow n,.z 
s40*
40%<own,_,
s60*
60% <own,.4 
s80*
ow n,.,
>80%
own
ovenll
Market 1
index P. |
Portfolio
Retum(%)
.943 1.004 .983 1.039 1.561 .989 .991
Riskless
Rate(%)
.399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk
Premium
.544 .605 .584 .64 1.162 .59 .592
ap(%) 3.537 3.887 4.123 4.492 5.112 3.814 3.894
SM .162 .156 .142 .142 .227 .155 .152
N* 1,007 1,009 799 521 99 3440 3,678
*N represents average numbers of monthly sample size for the entire study period from 
Jan. 1989 to Dec. 1996.
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Table 1-2 Sharpe Measure (SM) for Beta (p) Portfolio
Sample Beta Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)_______________
P.-i<5 •5<Pi«i£l I <P[_3J£ 1.5 l.5<P,.4s 2 P.-s> 2
Portfolio Return(%) .573 .827 1.055 1.359 1.838
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium .174 .428 .656 .96 1.439
<rp(%) 1.244 2.788 4.480 6.366 9.205
SM .140 .154 .146 .151 .156
N 687 1,030 909 457 341
Market Indexes Portfolio for Beta (Control Groups)
Pm-l^ -5 .5<Pm-2s l l< P m.js I.5 1.5<Pm_< 
s 2
Pm«J> 2
Portfolio Return(%) .614 .826 1.012 1.329 1.760
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium .215 .427 .613 .93 1.361
o9{%) 1.222 2.771 4.464 6.338 9.373
SM .176 .154 .137 .147 .145
N 725 1068 934 500 431
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Table 1-3 Sharpe Measure (SM) for Volatility (Oj) Portfolio
Sample Volatility Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)_____________
O|_t< .I0 . 10 c  . 13 .13<o,.3s.16 .16«r,.«s.20 .20
Portfolio Return(%) .702 .897 1.168 1.792 2.52
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium .303 .498 .769 1.393 2.121
oP(%) 2.548 3.856 5.109 6.701 8.477
SM .119 .129 .151 .208 .25
N 1,396 963 594 354 131
Market Indexes Portfolios for Volatility (Control Groups)
an.,< 1 0 .1 0 < o „ .is.l3 .13< a^„,s.l6 .I6 < ob. 4s .20 <j„_5>.20
Portfolio Reum(%) .706 .89 1.162 1.704 2.487
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium .307 .491 .763 1.305 2.088
ap(%) 2.518 3.842 5.151 6.8 8.879
SM .122 .128 .148 .192 .235
N 1,466 1,015 628 397 152
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Table 1-4 Sbarpe Measure (SM) for Firm Size (FS) Portfolio
Sample Firm Size Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)_____________
FS,., <$40* $40<FS,_2
£$120
$120<FS,.j
£$340
$340<FS ,.4 
$1,460
F S ,.,>
$1,460
Portfolio Rewrn(%) 1.730 1.141 .956 .832 .709
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium 1.331 .742 .557 .433 .31
of{%) 5.014 4.391 3.854 3.543 3.518
SM .265 .169 .145 .122 .088
N 455 692 716 780 780
♦Million Dollars are omitted for all firm size.
Market Indexes Portfolios for Firm Size (Control Groups)
FSm_,<$40* $40<FSB. I£
$120
$120 <  FS,.)£$340 $340<FSB_ £ $ l.
460
FS„.J>
$1,460
Portfolio Return(%) 1.62 1.048 .909 .792 .665
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium 1.221 .649 .51 .393 .266
5.294 4.575 3.913 3.585 3.551
SM .231 .142 .13 .11 .075 \
N 487 707 742 803 810 1
♦Million Dollars are omitted for all firm size.
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Table 1-5 Sharpe Measure (SM) for R&D Expenditures 
Sample R&D Portfolios (Based on Model 5-1)
Own< 
30* & 
RD 
<$I0»
Own < 
30* & 
10<RDs 
$100
Own <3 
0 * &  
RD > 
$100
30* < 
Owns60* 
4 R D  < 
$10
30* < 
OwnstiO* &
$!0<RDs 
< $100
30* < 
OwnstiO* 
&RD > 
$100
Own> 
60* & 
RD < 
$10
Own > 
6 0 * 4  
)0<RDs 
$100
Own > 
60* & 
RD> 
$100
Portfolio
Retum(%)
1.472 1.145 .798 1.454 1.369 .746 1.848 1.478 .901
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399
Risk Premium 1.073 .746 .399 1.055 .97 .347 1.449 1.079 .502
op(%) 5.195 5.002 4.45 5.098 5.587 3.959 6.494 5.64 4.57
SM .207 .149 .09 .207 .174 .088 .223 .191 .11
N 263 69 11 158 122 38 39 100 40
"'Million Dollars are omitted for all R&D expenditures.
Market Indexes Portfo ios for R&D Expenditures (Control Groups)t
RD
<$I0»
I0<RD*
$100
RD > 
$100
& RD < 
$10
&
$10<RDs
<$100
& RD > 
$100
RD < 
$10
MKRDs
$100
RD>
$100
Portfolio 
Retum( %)
1.403 1.265 .74 1.403 1.265 .74 1.403 1.265 .74
Riskless Rate(%) .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 .399 u>■U
-g
g
ou
u
1H
RD
>
$10
0
s
§
* § • a
Vtoae
a 1
••N
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Table 2-1A Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for Institutional Ownership
Institutional Ownership Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N EMR* ° t  or °im * T S H ta e ZSHi*
Own ,.,<20% 1,007 .541 3.372 13 94 .128 .219 . 5 8 7
Maiket index ? .(n J 3,678 .592 3.905
20%<0wn,.2s40% 1,009 .605 3.9 15 94 .054 .273 . 1 9 6
Maiket index P.f*) 3,678 .592 3.905
40%<0wn,.js60% 799 .584 4.129 16 94 -0.163 .207 - 0 . 7 8 9
Maiket index P.Q 3,678 .592 3.905
60%<Own,Ms 80% 521 .64 4.498 17 94 -0.163 .461 - 0 . 3 5 4
Maiket index P.(,„) 3,678 .592 3.905
Own ,_3>80% 99 1.162 5.113 18 94 1.51 .928 1 . 6 3 *
Maiket index P .fJ 3,678 .592 3.905
own overall 3,440 .59 3.825 14 94 .03955 .301 .1314
Market index 
P ^ J
3,678 .592 3.905
*EMR represents excess mean return, 
^represents significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2-1B Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for Institutional Ownership
Portfolio Comparisons Within Sample Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N EMR*
(P«)%
Oii% o,(% T SHjj e ZSH jm
Own w>80% 99 1.162 5.113 13.9 94 1.137 1.11
9
1.016
Own (.,<20% 1,007 .544 3.372
Own j.3>80% 99 1.162 5.113 17.7 94 1.44 .99 1.455
20%<Own(.2^4
0%
1,009 .605 3.9
Own j.j>80% 99 1.162 5.113 19.5 94 1.812 .867 2.089*
40%<Ownj.3s6
0%
799 .584 4.129
Own w>80% 99 1.162 5.113 21.4 94 1.954 .903 2.165*
60%<OwnM£8
0%
521 .64 4.498
*EMR represents excess mean return, 
^represents significant at the 2.5% level.
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Table 2-4A Jobson and Korkie's Statistics for Firm Size
Firm Size Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N E M R * ( p j  „
ra)%
orm^* °im% T S H jm d ZSHi(n
FS|.(<$40 455 1.331 5.013 26.2 94 .9268 .4524 2 . 0 4 9 * *
^  (irl<$40 488 1.221 5.295
$4(KFS,.2£$120 692 .742 4.397 19.9 94 .539 .2958 1 . 8 1 9 *
$4(XFSnr2Js$120 708 .649 4.571
$12(XFS j.jS$340 716 .557 3.868 15.1 94 .2152 .1754 1 .2 2 7
Sl20<IiSlir4s$340 743 .51 3.928
$340<FSH:s$l,460 780 .433 3.56 12.8 94 .161 .0864 1 . 8 6 3 *
$34tXFSnr4j;$l,460 804 .393 3.603
FS|.5>$ 1,460 781 .31 3.53 12.6 94 .177 .171 1 .0 3 2
FSm.3>$l,460 811 .266 3.6
♦EMR represents excess mean return, 
^represents significant at the 5% level.
** represents significant at the 2.5% level.
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Table 2-5A Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for R&D Expenditures
R&D Expenditures Portfolios (Based on Model 5-2 and 5-3)
N E M R * ( p j
orm )%
or ° im % T S H im e ZSH)ro
Own<30% & Rdj.,, 
<$10
263 1.073 5.192 27.7 94 .6224 .5875 1 .0 5 9
RDnr.<$lO 480 1.005 5.443
Own<30%& 
$10<RDW1 *$100
69 .746 4.993 24.7 94 -0.287 1.16 - 0 . 2 4 8
$10<RDm_j *$100 297 .866 5.411
Own<30% & 
$10<RDj.|, *$100
11 .399 4.439 14.1 94 .0919 1.2 . 0 7 6 6
RDm.J>$100 95 .341 4.024
30%<0wn*60%&
Rdj.3,<$10
158 1.055 5.101 26.7 94 .6159 .8 . 7 6 9 8
R D ^ IO 480 1.005 5.443
30%<0wn*60% &
$10<RDj.2i *$100
122 .97 5.589 29.6 94 .4086 .6478 . 6 3 0 7
$10<RDnrZ ^$100 297 .866 5.411
30%<Own* 60%& 
$10<RD,.2J *$100
38 .347 3.959 15.1 94 .0463 .5317 . 0 8 7
RDnr,J>$100 95 .341 4.024 144
■8
§ • m
co0
<
>fNO
1  H
J
3CO
N .6
56
.9
39 £
§
N
P
0 0
« n
E
X
c n
C -
r n i NO« n
E *
O n 3
S S
E 0 0
NO
© N N
9
O
r-*
O n
NO < n
m
3
</■>
5
0 0
m o
= L
t  s O  
B
u  s
O n
j
< n
s .
o \
© Soo ©i n r n
Z
O n
m
s 8 O n
N §
m
O n
S S
I s o9
s '
4  *
i ?  T
1  O M
VI
i 4 S£ 5A A  /V  ai £
8«■**s '
J
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
*E
MR
 
rep
res
en
ts 
ex
ce
ss 
me
an 
re
tu
rn
.
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
w
ithout perm
ission.
Table 2-5B Jobson and Korkie’s Statistics for R&D Expenditures
Portfolio Comparisons within Sample Portfolios
B a n n M B B a S B a K a n B B H B B B B B B B B B
N EMR*(pj
orm)%
®i or m°^° °im% T SHim e ZSH lm
30%<0wn«s60% & 
Rdj„2|<$10
158 1.055 5.1 18.3 94 2.276 1.6 1.422
Own>60% & 
RDj.jj>$100
40 .502 4.584
Own>60% & 
R«Vji <$10
39 1.449 6.497 23 94 3.387 1.827 1.85 *
Own>60% & 
RD|.j}>$100
40 .502 4.584
30%<0wns60% & 
Rdj.I(<$10
158 1.055 5.101 14 94 2.41 1.647 1.46
30%<0wns60%& 
$10<RDj.u *$100
38 .347 3.959
*EMR represents excess mean return.
^represents significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3-1 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Institutional Ownership (Based on Model 5-6)
Own
,.,<20%
20%<Own,.j
*40%
40%<Ownj.jS
60%
60%<Ownj.,s
80%
Own ,.,>80% Own overall
Pp .9342 1.188 1.212 1.258 1.217 1.112
Table 3-2 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Beta (Based on Model 5-6)
P h <5 0.5<pwsl,0 1.0<pwsl.5 1.5<piMs2.0 P t.s>2.0
Pp .3411 .7548 1.229 1.722 2.82
Table 3-3 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Volatility (Based on Model 5-6)
o ,.,<.10 ,1O<0 M!;.13 .13«j ,.,£.16 ,16«J|.4£.20 o w>.20
Pp .663 1.085 1.427 1.846 2.514
Table 3-4 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for Firm Size (Based on Model 5-6)
FS j.|<$40 $40<FS ,.2s$120 $120<FS j.jS$340 $340<FSiMs$l,460 FS,.}>$ 1,460
1.556 1.415 1.112 .9584 .932
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Table 3-S Portfolio Betas (flp) for R&D Expenditures (Based on Model 5-6)
Own<30% & Own<30% & Own<30% &
Rdj.,i<$10 $10<RD|.I2 s$100 $1<KRDWJ s$100
pp(Portfolio beta) 1.601 1,521 1,024
30%<Owns 60%& 30%<0wns60% & 30%<0wns60% &
Rdj.j,<$10 SKXRDj.j] s$100 $10<RDj.u $$100
pp(Portfolio beta) 1.708 1.406 .903
Own>60% & Own>60% & $ Own>60% &
Rdj.j|<$10 KKRD,.,, s$100 SKKRDj.,, s$100
pp (Portfolio beta) 1.624 1.398 1.194
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Table 4-1 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Institutional Ownership Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios Intercept(a) P-value Prob>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
Own j„|<20% .000554 .59 .92 .0001 1,007
20%<0wnj.,s40% .000216 .74 .97 .0001 1,009
40%<0wii|.js60% -0.000278 .76 .96 .0001 799
60%<Ownj.j s 80% -0.000095 .95 .91 .0001 521
Own w>80% .004595 .0457 .82 .0001 100
Own overall .000127 .74 .99 .0001 3,440
Table 4-2 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Beta Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios Intercept(a) P-value Prob>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
Ph<5 .000626 .57 .33 .0001 687
0.5<pMsl.0 .000166 .82 .94 .0001 1,030
1.0<pwsl.5 -0.00014 .87 .97 .0001 909
1.5<piM£2.0 0.000159 .91 .96 .0001 457
P i-5>20 .000849 .72 .94 .0001 341
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Table 4-3 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Volatility Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios Intercept(a) P-value Piob>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
o ,.,<.10 -0.000593 .54 .87 .0001 1,396
,10<o ms .13 -0.000764 .35 .96 .0001 963
, 1 3 < o 16 0.000123 .92 .95 .0001 594
.16«J h $.20 0.004393 .07 .88 .0001 354
o ,.j>.20 .009559 .01 .82 .0001 131
Table 4-4 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for Firm Size Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios Intercept(a) P-value Prob>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
FSW<S40 0.006213 .001 .87 .0001 455
$40<FS ,.,£$120 0.000956 .40 .94 .0001 692
$120<FS (.jsS340 -0.000195 .80 .97 .0001 716
$340<FS M£$l,460 -0.00092 .29 .95 .0001 780
FS t.}>$ 1,460 -0.001717 .29 .81 .0001 780
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Table 4-5 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for R&D Expenditures Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios Intercept(a) P-value Prob>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
Own<30%&
RdH)<$10
.003511 .11 .84 .0001 263
Own<30%& 
$10<RDh i £$100
.00101 .71 .73 .0001 69
Own<30%& 
$10<RDW, £$100
-0.000419 .91 .43 .0001 11
30%<Own£ 60%& 
Rd,.I(<$10
.003351 .089 .87 .0001 158
30%<0wn£60% & 
$1(XRDM2 £$100
.001878 .41 .85 .0001 122
30%<Owi»£60% & 
$10<RD,.U £$100
-0.00108 .69 .58 .0001 38
Own>60% & 
Rdj.j,<$10
.00612 .09 .72 .0001 39
Own>60% & $ 
10<RDH2 £$100
.003298 .25 .77 .0001 100
Own>60%& 
$10<RD,.„ £$100
-0.000826 .75 .71 .0001 40
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Table 5-1 Jensen’s Alpha (a) Measure for the January Firm Size Portfolio (Based on Model 5-4)
Portfolios Intercept(a) P-valuePtob>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
FS |.|<$40 0.00111 .88 .78 .004 377
$4(KFSr2s$120 -0.002585 .55 .91 .0002 649
$120<FSwsS340 -0.002039 .57 .92 .0002 680
$340<FS iM£$ 1,460 -0.00039 .90 .95 .0001 743
FS,.j>$ 1,460 -0.00597 .12 .96 .0001 753
Table 5-2 Portfolio Betas (Pp) for the January Firm Size (Based on Model 5-4)
FS |.|<$40 $40<FSwiS120 $120<FSws$340 $340<FS iM£$l,460 FS (.,>$1,460
Pp 1.3714 1.4164 1.112 .9566 .926
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Table 6-1 Regression Results for the Relationship Between Institutional Ownership 
and R&D Expenditures (Based on Model 5-9)
Variable Parameter Estimate P-alueProb>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
Intercept 7.4058 .0001 .27 .0001 9,621
Institutional
Ownership
.042214 .0001
Table 6-2 Regression Results for R&D Expenditures and Ownership Model Which 
Incorporates Variables for Asset (Based on Model 5-9)
Variable Parameter
Estimate
P-ValueProb>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F
"  1| Intercept .4917 .0006 .62 .0001 2,481
Institutional
Ownership
.009771 .0001
Asset* .700629 .0001
* Asset is represented by natural logarithm.
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Table 6-3 Regression Results for the Relationship Between R&D 
Expenditures and Total Assets (Based on Model 5-9)
Variable Parameter
Estimate
P-ValueProb>|T| R2 F-value Prob >F N
Intercept -0.28766 .0001 .66 .0001 9,621
Asset .788853 .0001
Table 7-1 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Volatility Beta R&D Asset Ownership
Volatility 1 .50921 -.197 -0.3651 -0.0407
Beta 1 -.042 -0.1368 0.098
R&D 1 0.767 0.454
Asset 1 0.322
Ownership 1
in
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Table 7-2 Multiple Regression Results for Joint Effect Test 
with All Variables (Based on Model 5-10)
I Variable Parameter
Estimate
P-ValueProb>|T| VIF Eigenvalue Condition 1 
Index
Intercept -0.0364 0.0001 0 - -
Ownership 0.000213 0.0001 1.274 0.205 3.3555
Beta 0.0021 0.0006 1.444 1.403 1.2835
Volatility 0.06754 0.0001 1.631 2.313 1.0000
R&D* -0.00253 0.0001 2.582 0.430 2.3192
Asset* 0.004 0.0001 2.949 0.648 1.8888
R-square =0.0591 Adjusted R-square =0.0571
F-Value =28.749 F-value Prob >F =0.0001
N =2,292
♦Two variables are represented by natural logarithm.
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Table 7-3 Multiple Regression Results for Joint Effect Test Without R&D Expenditures
(Based on Model 5-10)
Variable Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Prob>|T| VIF Eigenvalue Condition
Index
Intercept -0.00615 0.0234 0 - -
Ownership 0.000173 0.0001 1.105 0.41187 2.049
Beta 0.001314 0.0001 1.423 1.21274 1.194
Volatility 0.028149 0.0004 1.591 1.72901 1.000
Asset* 0.000285 0.1323 1.258 0.64637 1.635
R-square =0.0232 Adjusted R-square =0.0227
F- Value =47.175 F-value Prob >F =0.0001
N =7,959
*Two variables are represented by natural logarithm.
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HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS
NULL HYPOTHESIS REJECT FAIL TO 
REJECT
IMPLICATIONS
H01: Mean risk-adjusted excess 
returns of stock portfolios do not 
correlate positively with 
institutional investor 
concentration percentages.
XXXXX Institutional investors as a whole are not better performers than 
market index. However, they possessed a partial superior stock 
selection ability. Individual portfolios performed in a superior 
manner. Portfolios held in greater percentage by institutions 
performed better than those with less holdings by institutions.
Ho2: Stock portfolios with higher 
P risk do not exhibit greater 
risk-adjusted abnormal rates of 
return than those with lower p 
risk for market-based portfolios 
of equal systematic risk.
XXXXX Portfolios with larger beta stocks did not outperform portfolios with 
small beta stocks for market based portfolios of equal systematic risk. 
Higher beta portfolio did not contribute to the institutional investors’ 
superior stock selection ability.
Ho3: Stock portfolios with higher 
volatility exhibit greater or less 
rates of return than those with 
lower volatility.
XXXXX Stock portfolios with higher volatility exhibited greater rates of 
return than those with lower volatility. Jensen’s alpha measure 
implies that stock volatility may be used to contribute to institutional 
investor’s excess stock selection ability.
H04: Stock portfolios composed 
of small firms' stocks do not 
exhibit greater risk-adjusted rates 
of return than those composed of 
large firms' stocks, ceteris 
paribus.
XXXXX The smaller firms generated higher monthly mean excess risk- 
adjusted rates of return. The larger firms generated lower mean 
excess risk-adjusted rates of return. In this study, the small firm 
effect resulted in the greatest contribution to institutions’ superior 
selection power. However, the small firm-January effect could not be 
found.
w*-J
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HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS (continued)
NULL HYPOTHESIS REJECT FAIL TO 
REJECT
IMPLICATIONS
H0Sa: Firms' R&D expenditures 
and institutional stock ownership 
percentages do not correlate.
XXXXX Institutional investors are not myopic investors. They are consistent 
to previous results by Kochhar and David (1996) and Hansen and 
Hill (1991). In the context of R&D expenditures, institutional 
investors acted hyperopically.
H^b: Stock portfolios with 
higher R&D expenditures and 
higher concentrations of 
institutional investors do not 
exhibit greater risk-adjusted rates 
of return than those with less 
R&D expenditures and lower 
concentrations of institutional 
investors, ceteris paribus.
XXXXX R&D expenditures were not positively correlated with portfolio 
performance. Both bigger firms and higher institutional ownership 
are positively correlated with higher R&D expenditures. However, 
bigger firms are inversely related to portfolio performance. It 
implies that institutional investors prefer larger firms with higher 
R&D expenditures. They expect higher R&D expenditures would 
bring higher profits in the long-run.
0 0
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